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Wiley Rutledge and Executive Detention:
A Judicial Conscience for His Time and Ours
Judicial biography has never been more popular than it is today, nor more politically
relevant. As a Harvard law professor, Felix Frankfurter long ago announced the need for fulllength stories of Supreme Court Justices “to rescue the Court from the limbo of impersonality.”1
He wrote that “[u]ntil we have penetrating studies of the influence of these [judges], we shall not
have an adequate history of the Supreme Court, and, therefore, of the United States.”2 That call
has been answered with respect to many jurists,3 yet even fifty years after Wiley Rutledge died,
no account had emerged of Frankfurter’s colleague on the Courtfrom 1943 to 1949 ,4 leaving
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FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 6 (1937) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE]. Frankfurter claimed that “[a] full-length analysis of only two or three of
the seventy-eight Supreme Court Justices has been attempted.” That appraisal was at least
slightly exaggerated when written. See, e.g., ALBERT JEREMIAH BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL (1919); WILLIAM BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905); FRANK
MONAGHAN, JOHN JAY: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY (1935); JAMES PIKE, CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE
(1873); BERNARD STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOK TANEY, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (1922); CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW
(1930). And Frankfurter himself also contributed to the field. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE CONSTITUTION; A REVIEW OF HIS TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1927); cf. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (Felix Frankfurter, ed., 1932). Thus, any
“impersonality” that might persist in cloaking the Court surely does not owe to a lack of judicial
biographies. For recent examples, see for example, DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO
ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE (1998); ANDREW PEYTON
THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY (2001); JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL (2001); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (2000).
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See, e.g., LIVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER (1969); J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR.
JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1968); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998);
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956); BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (2003); ROGER K.
NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994).
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The only prior book-length writing on Rutledge is FOWLER V. HARPER, JUSTICE
RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION (1965), but it does not aspire to full biography and
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many modern readers with no impression at all of Rutledge or his work. That is a real shame, but
its force was known only to experts and insiders, not thelegal com munity at large.5
John Ferren’s Salt of the Earth: Conscience of the Court6 is the first full biography of
Rutledge, one which should easily rescue Rutledge from the shadows of obscurity and his Court
from any residual “limbo.”7 Part I of this Review will show that Rutledge deserves that much.
His pre-judicial life as a two-time dean, a force for legal reform, and an advocate of progressive
politics holds interest in its own right, and provides important background for his work on the
bench. Furthermore, as Ferren’s book demonstrate, Rutledge’s personal tale interweaves with
broader national issues, including details of FDR’s eight Supreme Court appointments, the path
of twentieth-century legal education, and the New Deal’s influence on both.
Part II of this Reviewwill show that Rutledge’s story has much more than Frankfurterian

is of varied quality. Until recently, the best sources on Rutledge were two essays, John Paul
Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in MR. JUSTICE 177 (1983) (Allison Dunham & Phillip Kurland,
eds.,), and Louis H. Pollak, Wiley Blount Rutledge: Profile of a Judge, in SIX JUSTICES ON CIVIL
RIGHTS (Ronald D. Rotunda, ed. 1983) [hereinafter Pollak, Profile of a Judge], and a memorial
published jointly by the Indiana and Iowa law journals, Symposium, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 25
IND. L. J. 421 (1950); 35 IOWA L. REV. 541 (1950). See also David M. Levitan, Mr. Justice
Rutledge, 34 VA. L. REV. 393, 526 (1948); Louis H. Pollak, Wiley B. Rutledge, 1943-1949, in
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, 41 (1993) (Clare
Cushman, ed.); Fred Landon G. Rockwell, Justice Rutledge on Civil Liberties, 59 YALE L.J. 27
(1949).
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In describing how his book about Rutledge came to be, Ferren explains that he wanted,
after leaving his own judicial post, to write a complete biography of “someone in our national
political life.” JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT 543 (2004). In
his search for a subject, Ferren contacted the Library of Congress’s Assistant Chief of
Manuscripts, who “immediately” named Wiley Rutledge as someone who had escaped due
attention, and “whose papers, he assured me, contained a book worth writing.” Id.
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history to recommend it. President Bush has claimed in today’s courts a power to detain
individuals without judicial oversight, without criminal charges, and at most with hand-crafted
military commissions to judge alleged criminal behavior. Such issues may seem novel to modern
minds, but they would not to Rutledge; indeed, the most important cases of his day concerned
such detention authority. More than any Justice, Rutledge’s career embodies the difficulties,
perils, and even mistakes that surround issues of wartime detention. After nearly sixty years,
Rutledge’s analysis of executive detention has already proved uniquely influential in one recent
case concerning Guantanamo Bay; another Rutledge opinion may affect modern analysis of
military tribunals. In sum, after a lengthy period of neglect, there is no better time to study this
judge and his work.
Part III’s conclusion will briefly address the relevance of Rutledge’s life and Ferren’s
book to the deepest issues of any judicial biography, namely, what judges should do and who
they should be. Consider why any one reads judicial biographies in the first place. Compared to
politicians, movie stars, and other common “biograph-ees,” judges’ lives are typically filled with
plodding, sedentary events that would not make for a gripping read. A critical, unacknowledged
reason that lawyers and scholars find such books are appealing, however, is the light their
subjects shed on judging and judicial role.
That said, judicial biographies are typically written only about jurists who serve the Court
for decades and radically reformulate one or another field of (preferably constitutional) law.
Ferren’s book is an intellectually significant invitation forreaders to appreciate a judge who
meets neither criterion. Insofar as Ferren succeeds, and Rutledge is recognized both as a
distinctive “type” of judge and a worthy role model for judicial behavior, the book offers a
3

chance to rethink the standards by which we choose judicial heroes for study and celebration.
Drawing such questions to lightis especially useful today, as politiciansselect new Justices, and
those individuals seek to define their own approaches to the Court’s work.
I.

All-American Jurist
Before analyzing Rutledge’s work as a judge, some readers may gain from knowing basic

details about his life that unquestionably affected his approach to doctrine and law. A dominant
virtue of Ferren’s book is its balance of detail and brevity, and this Part pursues similar goals in
more limited space.
In 1894, the boy who became Justice Rutledge was born to a Southern Baptist “circuitriding preacher” and a mother who died of tuberculosis nine years later. 8 After growing up with
his father and other relatives in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee, Rutledge studied at
the small Maryville College, where he joined the Law Club and engaged in assorted public
debates and oratory. Rutledge was an outgoing collegian who earned social respect and
academic success, especially in the humanities. Before his senior year, however, Rutledge
transferred to the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and switched his academic focus to
chemistry, which he thought would provide better career options than, for example, law.
When Rutledge (fortunately) found little success as a scientist, he studied shorthand and
8

For more elaborate discussion supporting this summary of Rutledge’s life, see generally
FERREN, supra note 5, at 13-31 (describing Rutledge’s youth and college experience); id. at 3138 (treatment and teaching in New Mexico); id. at 38-51 (law school and private practice); id. at
51-52 (teaching at the University of Colorado); id. at 55-80 (teaching at the Washington
University); id. at 81-83, 100-30 (teaching at the University of Iowa); id. at 137-50 (consideration
for Justice Cardozo’s vacancy); id. at 151-70 (consideration for Justice Brandeis’s vacancy); id.
at 173-207 (work on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); id. at 208-21
(nomination to Justice Byrnes’s vacancy); id. at 222-415 (work on the Supreme Court); id. at
416-22 (death and memorials).
4

moved to Bloomington, Indiana, where he took morning law classes and taught high school in
the afternoon. After three semesters, Rutledge found the double-shifts unworkable. Because he
could not afford full-time education, Rutledge moved again and began teaching high school fulltime in eastern Indiana.
In 1916, a twenty-two- year-old Rutledge was diagnosed with tuberculosis and sought
treatment in North Carolina. The next eight months could have been intensely isolating, but
Rutledge’s drive to interpersonal contact led him to meet people from all walks of life whose
suffering was worse than his own.9 Even after his inpatient treatment, Rutledge’s health kept
him from military service and almost kept him out of the public schools. Nonetheless, Rutledge
married his lifelong love (a former Maryville teacher) and moved to New Mexico where he could
teach high school business students in a climate congenial to physical recovery. Rutledge’s wife
taught English, and the family saved in order to complete Rutledge’s education, which he
compared to “a house, built to the roof, the rafters laid . . . but there’s no top.”10
In 1919, Rutledge began law school at the University of Colorado in Boulder while also
teaching high school. This time, Rutledge flourished in both capacities. Professor Herbert S.
Hadley, a former Governor and Attorney General of Missouri, was especially impressed, and, as
a third-year student, Rutledge taught much of Hadley’s first-year criminal law class. After
9

Id. at 34 (“By his own accounting . . . [Rutledge] had come together with ‘lawyers,
doctors, preachers, students, students, teachers, mountaineers, steel workers, farmers, sheriffs,
bankers, bookkeepers, clerks, railroad men, insurance men, scions of wealthy families,
merchants, dependant children, nurses, and many, many others.’ He met a man who looked like
‘a living skeleton,’ never spent an hour out of bed, was aware that death was certain, and yet
never uttered a ‘cheerless or discouraged’ word.”).
10

Id. at 34 (“Don’t you hate to see a house, built to the roof, the rafters laid, and left to
stand there in the weather without a cover? That’s just how I feel --- the foundation’s there, the
5

graduation in 1922, Rutledge joined a local law firm, became a father, and reengaged his
longstanding interest in public speaking. His private practice lasted only two years before a
unexpected, life-shaping opportunity struck. Professor Hadley left Colorado to become
chancellor at Washington University in St. Louis, another Colorado professor followed, and
Rutledge filled the latter’s vacancy. Rutledge made the most of the honor and soon earned
reports of “very considerable success” as a teacher.11 Rutledge’s expertise lay in corporations
and business law, but consistent with contemporary practice, his early years were spent “teaching
around the curriculum” in a wide range of classes.
In 1926, Chancellor Hadley offered Rutledge a position at Washington University’s law
school. He accepted the offer not only for “usual considerations of advancement,” but also so his
family (now with a second child) could be closer to relatives.12 In moving to St. Louis, Rutledge
joined an institution in flux. The law school’s faculty was of mixed quality, its transition to
“case method” instruction was overdue, its students were poorly credentialed and immature, its
finances were poor, and the Association of American Law Schools had imposed a two-year
probation for poor standards and performance. Nevertheless, Rutledge continued to excel,
earning a reputation as among the school’s best, hardest, fairest teachers.13 Four years after

framework & all, but there’s no top.”).
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Id. at 52.
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Id.
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Id. at 62 (“When several students were unprepared he was known to slam his book shut,
dismiss the class, and walk out. The students considered him ‘fair’ nonetheless, even while
definitely the ‘hardest grader.’”); id. at 62-63 (quoting effusive praise from former students, some
of whom regarded Rutledge as brilliant, the most outstanding law professor they’d ever met, and
a man of great character); cf. id. at 111 (“One student spoke for many: ‘I would have hated to
inform him I was not prepared. . . . I would have had the feeling I was letting down a very, very
6

joining the faculty, Rutledge — at the age of thirty-seven — was named dean of the law school,
and over 80 percent of Washington University’s senior class petitioned the board of directors to
support that choice.14
Rutledge’s deanship from 1930 to 1935 was impressive. He restructured the law review’s
admission process to improve student writing and access. He organized law school assemblies
wherein lecturers analyzed connections between law and social sciences.15 He raised admission
standards, consolidated the curriculum, expanded ethics instruction, began a legal aid clinic,
started a master of laws degree, bolstered the school’s thesis requirement, and strengthened
synergies between lawyers and social workers to increase opportunities for the law school and its
students. Such progress was by no means universal. For example, Rutledge never confronted
racial segregation at Washington University, nor did he commit to increase women’s enrollment.
Still, Dean Rutledge led his school many steps forward, and in doing so attracted attention in
academic circles and beyond.
Aside from his paternal responsibilities (now with three children), Rutledge was also
active in St. Louis public life and was a strong advocate for legal reform, including the use of
women jurors, criminal code revision, access to criminal defense, and apolitical bar standards.
Rutledge was active on St. Louis’s Social Justice Commission, which sought to reduce racial and
religious tensions, and he was a director on the St. Louis Civil Liberties Committee. On the

fine man.”).
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Id. at 66.
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It should be noted that interdisciplinary work in Rutledge’s day was viewed as a
progressive alternative to the formalism that made Langdell famous. See generally id. at 87-89
(interpreting Rutledge’s legal philosophy as substantially linked to that of Roscoe Pound).
7

national stage, Rutledge served on the Association of American Law Schools and the American
Law Institute; he was also a dedicated member of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.16
The legal issue that drew Rutledge’s most urgent attention was child labor, which, as the
Depression worsened, caused marked increases in accidental injury, illiteracy, and childhood
tuberculosis. The Supreme Court had twice invalidated congressional efforts to regulate child
labor,17 and many prominent lawyers, including the American Bar Association’s President,
strongly opposed a constitutional amendment to overrule those decisions. Despite such views in
the legal establishment, Rutledge’s attacks on child labor were broad and forcefully stated:
Social progress in the form of national legislation is faced constantly with the
three hurdles of so-called “natural rights,” “state rights,” and “republican
institutions. . . . [These] are the sheep’s wool in which the institution of human
slavery was legally clothed; the guise under which . . . trusts sought freedom from
national restraint in order to establish monopoly; the shield behind which vast
power combinations seek similar freedom today; the basis upon which workmen’s
compensation acts, minimum wage laws, laws regulating hours of labor, and all
other forms of legislation in the public interest have been resisted. Nowhere have
these hoary philosophies been more effectively employed than in tying the hands
of the federal government in the protection of children.18
16

For Rutledge, not all of these accolades and responsibilities were equal in value. For
example, Rutledge throughout his career preferred his work for the National Conference, which
he viewed as more democratic and pragmatic, to the American Law Institute, which at that time
risked the opposite. See id. at 84-85, 121-22. One of Rutledge’s more significant social
activities was the “Public Question Club,” a professional group that held dinner discussions on
issues from economics to football to philosophy to crime to science to politics to drama. Such
talks led Rutledge not only to refine his public speaking, but to revise his private thinking as
well. Ferren suggests thatthese meetings fed Rutledge’s skepticism of religious dogma and of
racial barriers in education and elsewhere. Id. at 72-73 (describing debates on topics such as
“Have Minorities Any Rights?,” and identifying Rutledge’s wife as an important influence on his
racial views).
17

United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918).
18

Id. at 75.
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Rutledge was repeatedly thwarted in urging Missouri to ratify the Child Labor Amendment, but
he did succeed in setting forth his commitment to broad federal power, his progressive politics,
and his view of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In 1935, Rutledge left St. Louis to become dean at the University of Iowa, a move that
owed chiefly to bureaucratic disputes among other Washington University administrators. The
change also raised Rutledge’s profile and gave him a home with greater academic resources and
talent, but the environment was not entirely progressive. For example, when Rutledge sought
curricular reforms favoring interdisciplinary and clinical education, faculty resistance limited
such efforts to merely adding a “judicial process” class, which Rutledge himselfagreed to teach.
Rutledge continued to succeed as a teacher, and he pursued extracurricular activities as
before, including lectures on interdisciplinarity, speeches to social organizations, and service to
the National Conference on Uniform State Laws. Rutledge increased his participation in the
AALS, where he drafted a report criticizing inadequate services for the unemployed, and the
bar’s “almost appalling apathy and indifference . . . toward any effective general program of legal
aid extension.”19 He wrote that “[n]o legal system can survive . . . [when] so large a proportion
of the general population” is ignored.20 Similarly, at a state level, Rutledge advocated reforming
bar standards and “unauthorized practice” rules to increase the service of indigent clients by
19

Id. at 120.
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Id. The unapologetic reformism of Rutledge’s draft was not altogether welcomed by
other deans. See id. at 121 (quoting the University of Illinois’s dean as calling the report “too
contentious,” and Yale’s dean as predicting it would “probably offend not merely the lawyers,
but also the law teachers . . . [Y]ou would be well advised to change the tone of the report quite
considerably.”). But cf. id. (quoting other deans’ support for the draft as “splendid” in its
“provocative character”).
9

laymen and nonlegal experts.
Among Rutledge’s most controversial activities was supporting FDR’s “court-packing
plan,” which would have added fifty judges to the federal bench, including six Supreme Court
Justices, wherever existing judges were at least seventy years old with ten years of service.21
Rutledge shared others’ concerns about “political control of the court,” but he viewed the
challenges of underconsumption, employment displacement, land planning, conservation, and
social security as inexorably requiring dynamic government. 22 Because Rutledge believed the
Constitution was flexible enough to serve those needs, he characterized the Supreme Court’s
restrictive case law as threatening “basic principles of national democracy,” possibly someday
risking “another Dred Scott situation.”23 If States (like Missouri) could not ratify constitutional
provisions like the Child Labor Amendment to overrule the Court’s decisions, Rutledge thought
a change in judicial personnel was the most feasible solution.24
Rutledge delivered several speeches on the court-packing plan, and he even agreed to
testify before Congress.25 The Court, however, displaced any need for such testimony — and for

21

Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, S.1392, 62nd Cong. See generally, e.g.,
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133-34 (1995) (describing the court-packing plan in more detail).
22
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Id.
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It should be said that, even in such dire circumstances, Rutledge did not support other
proposals to rein in the Supreme Court, such as requiring a supermajority vote before the Court
could invalidate a legislative act, or allowing Congress to reenact statutes that the Court had
struck down. Id. at 127.
25

Rutledge’s agreement to support of the court-packing proposal set him in direct
opposition to the dean of the University of Michigan law school, a fact which was reported in the
Des Moines Register, and once more placing Rutledge prominently in the public arena due to his
10

FDR’s plan — by changing directions on its own. Even as legislative hearings were underway in
March 1937, the Court reversed a one-year-old precedent and upheld a state minimum wage law;
in April, the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act; and in May, it upheld the Social
Security Act.26 Given such dramatic reversals, Congress contented itself with providing Justices
over seventy years old with ten years’ service the option of full-salary retirement.27
Despite Roosevelt’s failure to impose institutional change on the Court, he influenced
that organ by making eight judicial appointments.28 Rutledge was mentioned several times
among FDR’s nominees, first as a possible successor to Justice Cardozo in 1938.29 Irving Brant,
a democratic writer from St. Louis,30 brought Rutledge to Roosevelt’s attention, in part due to his
views of child labor and social change in law. In Rutledge, Brant saw a young, liberal thinker
who might combine personal skills, legal talents, and perseverance to “win over” the Court’s
moderate and conservative members.
The prohibitive frontrunner for Cardozo’s seat, however, was the brilliant Harvard law

controversial, pro-Roosevelt views.
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West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Ex rel. Tipaldo, 298
U.S. 587 (1936); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
27

Supreme Court Retirement Act , 28 U.S.C. 375 (1937).
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It should be said that one of those, Justice James F. Byrnes, served for only sixteen
months before resigning to direct Roosevelt’s Office of Economic Stabilization. FERREN, supra
note 5, at 206-08.
29

Roosevelt’s first two appointments were Hugo Black, who succeeded Willis Van
Devanter, and Stanley Reed, who succeeded George Sutherland. Id. at 131-37.
30

Among Brant’s numerous writings is an extraordinary biography of James Madison.
IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON, 6 vols. (1941, 1948, 1950, 1953, 1956, 1961).
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professor, Felix Frankfurter, whom even Brant himself preferred. Frankfurter’s candidacy was
opposed by significant pressures to place a “westerner” on the bench and to avoid (or appease)
possible anti- semitic sentiment that might accompany the appointment of a second Jewish
Justice.31 Therefore, Brant pressed Rutledge as a second-best option, or perhaps for future
vacancies. Describing Iowa’s dean as a man of “extreme modesty and simplicity,” Brant added
that “[h]e has met what I regard as the one and only absolute test of liberalism — he has been a
liberal in conservative communities and against all counterpressures, and where all logical
prospect of gain to himself, and all social factors, ran in the opposite direction.”32 Such
steadfastness appeared throughout Rutledge’s political and academic life, from emphasizing
interdisciplinary education to opposing child labor. Unknowingly confirming appraisals of his
humility, Rutledge wrote to Brant that Frankfurter would be “an ideal selection, notwithstanding
the geographical qualification,” and suggested that geographic considerations “should be
disregarded” because there was not “anyone west of the Mississippi that I know who would be
even within close distance to Frankfurter on the basis of qualifications, with the possible
exception of [Fifth Circuit Judge] Joseph C. Hutcheson of Texas.”33
Brant was by no means the only one pressing Rutledge’s candidacy,34 but his efforts
combined with other forces to maintain Rutledge as an alternative to Frankfurter throughout a
31

Such circumstances had previously emerged when President Hoover appointed
Benjamin Cardozo to a Court on which Louis Brandeis continued to serve. FERREN, supra note
5, at 139.
32

Id. at 143.

33

Id.

34

Other supporters included faculty from Washington University and prominent members
of the St. Louis and Iowa bar. Id. at 148-50.
12

long nomination process. When Frankfurter was chosen and confirmed, Rutledge supporters
braced for other judicialvacancies, and they did not wai t long, as Justice Brandeis retired just a
few weeks after Frankfurter’s confirmation. Rutledge was again a serious contender but was
again passed over. This time, Roosevelt chose William Douglas for the Supreme Court and
installed Rutledge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In 1939, Rutledge began his decade of judicial service with “perhaps the most strenuous
year” of his life.35 Rutledge’s stressors had several causes, including a penchant for long writing,
an academic’s curiosity, a drive to maintain personal ties and correspondence, close attention to
complex factual records, an insistence on teaching summer school classes, and inherent demands
of the courts he served. Such double- and triple-duty was nothing new to Rutledge, but perhaps
it sometimes weighed on him more as a judge. At the timeof Rutledge’s appointment , the
District of Columbia’s Court of Appeals had a unique docket, comprised of appeals from the
federal district court, administrative agency reviews, and appeals from municipal courts that
concerned contracts, torts, criminal, family law, and the like.36 The court had six members, five
of whom were Roosevelt appointees, four were former academics, and two were staunch
conservatives. Although Rutledge never said so, his experience on this smallappellate court,
with its diverse docket and divided membership, must have been an ideal training ground for
what was yet to come.37

35

Id. at 181.
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JEFFERY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE:
THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 85-109 (2001).
37

A HISTORY OF

But cf. Pollak, Profile of a Judge, supra note 4, at 183 (describing this period as a
“substantial apprenticeship for the work which lay ahead on the Supreme Court”).
13

Rutledge did not let judicial work curtail outside commitments. For example, he
continued to stress in speeches across the country the meagerness of legal services for indigent
populations. In 1941, Rutledge was picked to help a young Herbert Wechsler develop a “new
legal personnel system for the Federal Government.”38 He also served on the National Railway
Labor Panel, which provided advice when mediation failed to resolve disputes affecting war
efforts. Continuing his penchant for populist reform, Rutledge floated a proposal to amend
District of Columbia’s government and grant residents congressionalrepresentation. Such
engagements only further complicated Rutledge’s early years on the bench.
While Rutledge was on the D.C. Circuit, Rooseveltmade four Supreme Court
appointments, yet Rutledge was not a serious candidate until James Byrnes’s resignation in
October 1943. Unlike other occasions, Rutledge actively discouraged the administration from
appointing him, in part due to the job’s incredible workload,39 but three factors pushed the other
way. First, Attorney General Francis Biddle sought advice from Chief Justice Stone, Justice
Black, and Justice Douglas. Those conversations confirmed Rutledge as the best available

38

FERREN, supra note 5, at 202.
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See, e.g., id. at 209 (writing to a friend that a Supreme Court post would be undesirable
because, “[w]hile I enjoy judging, I have had enough of it to know one has to make great
sacrifices . . . . This includes giving up time with friends and family, foregoing many of the most
pleasant associations in life, and grinding away at all hours of the day and night on hard, tough,
legal knots.”); id. at 210 (writing to another friend, “For God’s sake, don’t do anything about
stirring up the matter! I am uncomfortable enough as it is.”); id. (writing to Attorney General
Francis Biddle, “I hope you will believe me when I say that I do not have Supreme Courtitis. My
own feeling . . . was that the President should appoint a Republican to this vacancy, and I am still
inclined to feel that would be the wiser thing both for the Court and for the country. . . . If
[rumors about a Supreme Court nomination] I merely want merely to request that before any
action is taken I be given an opportunity to talk with you.”).
14

option, with Black and Douglas particularly “enthusiastic.”40
Second, Biddle asked his assistant, Herbert Wechsler, to analyze several candidates’
judicial work. The resultant memorandum noted Wechsler’s earlier experience with Rutledge,
and a favorable impression therefrom. But most importantly, the report offers a rare appraisal, by
someone as talented as Wechsler, of judicialwork without flattery and exaggeration.41 Wechsler
described Rutledge as having a “soundness of judgment, a searching mind, a properly progressive
approach to legal issues, some mastery of phrase and style — especially after the first year — and
a dominating effort to answer all the problems in terms that will satisfy the litigant and his lawyer
that their points have not been ignored.”42 Wechsler continued that “Rutledge’s most striking
trait [is] his warm sense for real people as the ultimate concern of law and his awareness of what
real people are like throughout this broad land.”43 And he stressed “constant evidence of the
quality — so treasured in Holmes — of pointing [out] the implications of small things, if only by
defining an underlying reason for a rule or a concealed principle of its growth.”44 Finally,
Wechsler noted that, in Rutledge’s judicial work, “[c]ivil liberty problems and review of
administrative agencies, especially in the labor field, have been the major issues. His work
leaves no room for doubt that these values are safe in his hand. More than this, however, I think
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Another candidate favored by sitting Justices was Learned Hand, who was uniformly
believed too old for the post, especially given the emphasis during FDR’s court-packing plan of
the need for young, vigorous Justices. Id. at 213, 217.
41

That said, many of the characteristics identified in Wechsler’s private report also appear
in Rutledge’s postmortem eulogies. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.
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Id. at 215.

43

Id.

44

Id.
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it shows an independence of mind within that framework. There is none of the easy factionalism
to which so many liberals succumb.”45
A third factor supporting Rutledge’s nomination was the tireless Brant, who ran a
coordinated campaign on his behalf. Brant sought endorsements from influential lawyers and
politicians in Missouri and Iowa, and he even visited FDR himself. As before, there remained
pressure to appoint a Justice from west of the Mississippi, and when the President first greeted
Rutledge as his nominee, he said — to the boy from Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee,
the teacher from New Mexico and Colorado, the dean from Missouri and Iowa, and the judge
from the District of Columbia— “Wiley, you have a lot of geography.” 46
When Rutledge reached the Supreme Court in February 1943, his colleagues were already
suffering interpersonal friction, and matters quickly grew worse. Seven of nine Justices were
FDR appointees, but Justices Robert Jackson and Frankfurter were conservatives whom Justice
Owen Roberts and Stanley Reed combined to oppose the Court’s liberal wing (Murphy, Douglas,
Black, Rutledge, and Stone). Ideological divisions paled, however, beside the conflicts over
propriety and ethics that reappeared throughout the Court’s next few years.47 Such controversies
45

Id.

46

Id. at 219.

47

A few examples may be useful. See FERREN, supra, 272-85. In January 1944, someone
leaked to the press that Rutledge could not decide how to vote in a pending administrative law
case. Roberts was furious and demanded a meeting, where Frankfurter suggested that Murphy or
Douglas was responsible. Both denied it, and the charge stoked their preexisting dislike of
Frankfurter. Roberts unsuccessfully tried to force Black to name the leaker, and thereafter
refused to speak to any Justice but Frankfurter and Jackson, decrying the rest as “men without
honor.”
Frankfurter annoyed Black, Murphy, Douglas, and others with recurrent pedantry,
condescension, and intracourt scheming. Douglas’s political ambitions were also a chronic
irritant, as was his penchant for taking summer recess before others’ opinions had circulated.
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are remarkable in their own right, but most important at present is the absence of bad behavior,
and bad blood, on Rutledge’s part. Whether it was his temperament, his experience as dean
(where factiousness can be common), or other factors, what is clear is that Rutledge kept his
interjudicial relations, like his public opinions, free of vitriol and snipe, despite working closely
with men sometimes afflicted by both.48
Ferren organizes his discussion of Rutledge’s judicial product by topic, documenting
Rutledge’s contributions to varied fields such as federalism, religious freedom, criminal
procedure, and free speech. This Review will not summarize that discussion, but Ferren’s
research offers ample insights about the Court’s process and results during this period.
Importantly, Ferren does not limit his story to Rutledge’s more famous work regarding civil
rights, nor to Rutledge’s “successes” in influencing precedent and future Courts. Instead, the
book offers a panoramic demonstration that, despite his lack of seniority and consequently

Many at the Court were unhappy that Jackson agreed to prosecute at the Nuremberg Trials
without advising even Chief Justice Stone, even though the departure shifted heavy burdens to
others on the Court. Black and Jackson had a terrible feud over whether Black should be recused
from a case argued by his former law partner, culminating in loud argument and pounded tables.
And Black and Stone divided bitterly over the language of a proposed retirement letter to
Roberts.
Ferren summarized the Court’s inner workings at the time Stone died in 1946: “Jackson
and Black were feuding. Douglas and Frankfurter were ignoring each other. Frankfurter and
Murphy exhibited mutual disdain, and, with Black, were still smarting after the [above press
leak]. Jackson and Murphy continued to feel a mutual antipathy . . . . And tempers were
smoldering since the fiasco surrounding Roberts resignation letter.” The press reported that two
Justices (Black and Douglas) would resign if Jackson were made the new Chief, and that Jackson
would resign if Black were promoted. When Truman nominated Fred Vinson, Jackson wrote a
truly disgraceful letter from Nuremberg to the chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees, reporting that his fight with Black went beyond a “mere personal vendetta,” and
struck at “the reputation of the court for nonpartisan and unbiased decision.” Id. at 328; see
Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Jackson-Black Feud, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 455 (2003).
48

See FERREN, supra note 5, at 329.
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limited assignments, Rutledge produced an extremely distinguished record of opinions and votes.
The “Roosevelt Court” had many fine judges — among the most distinguished enneads ever —
yet Ferren proves that Rutledge’s overall work compares favorably with that of any other Justice
in that time.
If Ferren’s description of Rutledge’s judicial service is unusually broad, thatowes partly
to the fact that Rutledge served the Court for only six years. In March 1947, Rutledge learned he
had high blood pressure, which was not helped by his unhealthful habits and exhausting
extrajudicial commitments. Clerks and family urged him to slow down, but in August 1949,
during the Court’s summer recess, a massive stroke caused Rutledge to collapse while driving,
and he died a few weeks later at the age of fifty-five.
*********
As the foregoing sketch of Rutledge’s life suggests, Ferren’s work reinforces the
historical relevance of full-length judicial biographies. When one reads a Rutledge opinion, it is
the work of a professor, a New Dealer, a dean, a midwesterener, and above all one who deeply
respected other people and earned in similar coin. The details presented in Ferren’s book allow
readers to measurably further their understanding of what Rutledge accomplished, and what his
decisions meant to theCourt and the country. As necessary sidelights, the book also illustrates
FDR’s efforts at “court-picking” and describes those legal issues that preoccupied the Court
during the years between the death of Lochner and the birth of Brown. Perhaps one cannot grasp
any era’s judicial work without seeing whence the Court came and where it went. And although
Ferren’s part of that tale is cast in personal terms, his efforts are a valuable resource for anyone
interested in the Supreme Court’s history and enduring significance.
18

Before leaving this discussion, two items deserve mention. First is Ferren’s focus on
Rutledge’s character and warmth, which appears from the book’s first page to its last. Some
readers may regard such sentimentality with skepticism, but a notable feature of Ferren’s work is
the evidence supporting his judgment. Ferren cites interviews with former law students and
colleagues from Washington University and Iowa, stories from family members, interviews with
those who clerked for Rutledge and other Justices, memoranda from presidential advisers,
comments from local store owners, and abundant personal correspondence. Such materials
confirm Ferren’s view of Rutledge’s personality and its link to his success. As Rutledge wrote in
a letter after his nomination to the Court:
I kn[ow] enough of myself to realize . . . that some mysterious leaven works up a
very small amount of real merit into a big return. The leaven isn’t brains, or
knowledge, or grandeur of character, or any such unusual thing. So far as I can
guess what it is — it’s that I like people, have some sort way of letting them know
it, and in turn they like me regardless of all the other deficiencies.49
Ferren wants to ensure that Rutledge’s humility and compassion are not lost amid other historical
details. Indeed, Ferren suggests that such personal traits were strong factors motivating
Rutledge’s consistent concern for minority religious and racial groups, as well as his attention to
procedural fairness.50
A second personal dimension of the story, which Ferren underplays, concerns Rutledge’s
law clerks. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Supreme Court Justices have hired young
law graduates to help research issues, manage requests for certiorari, and sometimes draft

49

FERREN, supra note 5, at 219.

50

See, e.g., FERREN, supra note 5, at 1; sources cite note 4.
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opinions.51 Although American legal education was once based entirely on apprenticeship,
clerking — at the Supreme Court and elsewhere — is among the last great examples of such
institutionalized mentoring. To be sure, clerkships vary immensely based on the personalities
involved, but the experience often propels young graduates toward careers with singularly
persistent impressions of what passes for law and good judgment.
For most of Rutledge’s tenure, Justices hired one law clerk per year; in 1948 and 1949,
they hired two. Rutledge thus had nine clerks at the Court, and they were a remarkable bunch:
One is a Harvard professor of corporate law, several became accomplished private counsel, one
was a two-time law school dean and is now a district court judge, another served the Seventh
Circuit, and another is Justice John Paul Stevens. Even among the lofty ranks of Supreme Court
clerks, such distinctions stand out,52 and several Rutledge clerks name their former employer as a
continued influence on their view of life and law. 53 This aspect of Rutledge’s legacy is perhaps
the strongest testament to his force as a teacher and role model. And as the next Part indicates,
that force has more than pure historical significance.
II.

Executive Power, Judicial Limits

51

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNTIED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21, at 8284 (1984) (summarizing the early history of Supreme Court law clerks); Chester A. Newland,
Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 O R. L. REV. 299 (1961)
(offering more extended analysis).
52

Cf. Pollak, Profile of a Judge, supra note 4, at 190 n.4 (cataloguing the even-moreextraordinary influence of Frankfurter’s clerks).
53

Cliff Sloan, The Mourning After: John Roberts Gives for His Mentor, SLATE (Sept. 7,
2005), at http://www.slate.com/id/2125848 (“The influence on these former-clerk justices of the
justices for whom they once worked is profound. Stevens speaks and writes reverentially of the
little-known Wiley Rutledge more than five decades after his clerkship.”).
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As is now clear, Ferren’s book and Rutledge’s story amply satisfy Frankfurter’s historical
aims for judicial biographies. But for many readers, history is not enough. Any artful biography
would convey the context surrounding its subject, yet few of us track down books about simply
any Justice. It is thus important for today’s audience that Ferren’s work lists more than
Frankfurter as a recommendation. Even for readers uninterested in history for its own sake, a key
feature that boosts the modern relevance of Rutledge’s story is its connection to present-day
circumstances. There are several fields in which Rutledge’s work relates to current legal
debates,54 but the most important is executive detention. After decades of jurisprudential quiet,
the President’s authority to detain is again a central issue in public life. This Part hopes to
demonstrate that the history of Justice Rutledge, more than any other, showshow such detentions
test the limits of judicial competence and legal principle.
Judicial review of executive detention can be analyzed in three parts: (i) jurisdiction for
courts to evaluate such detention, (ii) substantive standards for detaining those who are not
charged with any crime, and (iii)requirements for detainees who are charged for trial in military
tribunals. In each instance, the World War II cases in which Justice Rutledge played a critical
role have strong connections with modern cases that are pending or recently decided. First, with
respect to jurisdiction, Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens v. Clark addressed the territorial limits of

54

For other doctrinal parallels and analogies, compare, for example, Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (addressing the constitutionality of public payments to religious
schools); Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 466 (1947) (analyzing due process constraints on
states’ use of capital punishment) WILEY B. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH (1947)
(discussing the constitutionality of Congress’s commerce power), with, for example, Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (upholding school vouchers); Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.
Ct. 2195 (2005) (upholding the commerce regulation of medical marijuana); Roper v. Simmons,
125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (finding unconstitutional the execution of juvenile defendants).
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habeas jurisdiction, which was a key issue in Rasul v. Bush concerning modern detentions at
Guantanamo Bay. Justice Stevens was the Rutledge law clerk who helped draft the Ahrens
dissent, and (incredibly) it was Stevens half-a century later who wrote Rasul’s majority. We
shall see, however, thatAhrens ’s force grew from much more than just a law clerk’s loyalties.
Second, with respect to substantive standards for uncharged detention, Rutledge was the
dispositive fifth vote at conference in Korematsu v. United States, which involved the evacuation
of Japanese-Americans during World War II. Five decades later, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld addressed
the detention of uncharged “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay, and the three opinions
forming the Hamdi majority sought to avoid “another” Korematsu. Revisiting the basis for
Rutledge’s mistake in Korematsu offers unique insight to assessing whether modern Courts are
doomed to repeat it.
Third, Rutledge’s most well known opinion is his dissent in In re Yamashita, concerning
the trial of a Japanese general before a military commission. A pending Supreme Court case,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, raises similar issues in a military trial of Osama bin Laden’s driver. If the
Court grants certiorari in Hamdan, or in any of several military commission cases making their
way through the judicial branch, Rutledge’s work may again prove central in determining how
courts limit executive authority during an asserted national crisis.
A.

Ahrens and Rasul
In Ahrens v. Clark, the Attorney General ordered thatover a hundred German nationals

be deported under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which grants broad power over citizens of
nations at war with the United States.55 While the Ahrens detainees were at New York’s Ellis
55

335 U.S. 188 (1948); see 50 U.S.C. §§ 20-21; 10 Fed. Reg. 8947 (1945).
22

Island, they filed habeas corpus petitions in the District of Columbia, claiming that their
deportation orders issued unlawfully after the German war’s end. The decisive jurisdictional
issue in the Supreme Court was whether the district court could grant habeas relief to detainees
outside the District of Columbia. Seeking a quick resolution on the merits, the United States did
not contest jurisdiction and waived all defenses against reaching a decision in the District of
Columbia.56
Voting six to three, the Supreme Court found jurisdiction improper. Federal habeas
statutesallow federal judges, “within their respective jurisdictions, . . . to grant writs of habeas
corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty.”57 In Ahrens, the
Attorney General was undeniably “within” the district court’s jurisdiction. Yet Justice Douglas
wrote for the Court that habeas could not be granted to detainees who were not “confined or
restrained within the [court’s] territorial jurisdiction.” 58 It was not enough “that the jailer or
custodian alone be found in the jurisdiction”; the detainees themselves must be present as well.59
The Court discussed possible travel and security problems if prisoners across the country could
seek habeas, and ultimately appear, in a court where only their custodian was present.60 Relying
on (inconclusive) legislative history, the Court thus held that Congress excluded from habeas
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Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 193.
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28 U.S.C. 2241(a) (2000); cf. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82 (authorizing
habeas relief for prisoners “in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or
committed for trial before some court of the same”).
58

Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192.

59

Id. at 190.

60

Id. at 190-91.
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jurisdiction alldetainees located outside the issuing court’s territorial boundaries.61
Rutledge’s dissent was a classic, and has been described as “sufficiently representative to
provide us with an introduction to its author’s judicial career.”62 It met Douglas’s five-page
majority with eighteen in response, and Rutledge began by claiming that “[t]he jurisdictional turn
this case has taken gives it importance far beyond the serious questions tendered on the merits of
petitioners’ application.”63 Unlike the majority, Rutledge’s primary concern was not
governmental convenience in this case or others. Instead, he saw Ahrens as addressing the nature
of habeas corpus itself, with potentially serious consequences for circumstances where relief is
most essential.
Describing habeas review as basic to “the personal security of every citizen,” Rutledge
could not accept that a detainee’s physical location was prerequisite to judicial oversight.64 In
three circumstances, he found the majority’s “place-of-the-body” rule particularly unsatisfying:
(i) where the place of imprisonment is unknown, (ii) where the detainee is located in a district
where her custodian cannot be served, and (iii) where the place of detention is outside the limits
of any district court’s territorial jurisdiction.65 In such contexts, Rutledge viewed the Ahrens
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Id. at 191-93.
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Stevens, supra note 4, at 178.

63

Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 193 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); cf. FERREN, supra note 5, at 215
(attributing to Rutledge “the quality — so treasured in Holmes — of pointing [out] the
implications of small things, if only by defining an underlying reason for a rule or a concealed
principle of its growth”).
64
65

Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 193 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

Id. at 195. As a matter of style, former-Professor Rutledge’s introduction of these
points reads much like a classroom transcript, where the instructor poses hypothetical questions
not directly at issue but possible as extensions of the principle at stake.
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majority as creating insuperable barriers thatcould permit illegal detention without any chance of
relief.
Having identified thatbasic problem, Rutledge as legal technician surveyed statutory
language, legislative history, and other court decisions in painstaking detail, demonstrating that
none compelled the majority’s result.66 He further showed that the Court’s policy concerns about
travel and convenience would be better served by principles of venue, rather than inflexible
jurisdictional rules, because the latter cannot be waived or modified even under extraordinary
circumstances. Rutledge knew it would be “only the exceptional case of detention outside the
District and pursuant to authority independent of its affairs, which would require or even permit
the exercise of jurisdiction by its courts,” but “[i]t is one thing to lay down a rule of discretion
adequate to prevent flooding of the courts of the District of Columbia with applications for
habeas corpus from the country at large. It is entirely another to tie their hands, and those of all
inferior federal courts, with a strict jurisdictional limitation which can only defeat the writ’s
efficacy in many cases where it may be most needed.”67
Rutledge methodically rebutted each step of the majority’s reasoning, and the Court did
not try to respond. His affirmative basis for granting jurisdiction, however, was less technical
and more rooted in a substantive view of habeas corpus. For Rutledge, Ahrens’s worst results
could arise for detainees held “in places unknown to those who would apply for habeas corpus in
66

Id. at 201-07.

67

Id. at 209-10. Rutledge noted that the majority “reserved decision upon cases where the
place of confinement is not within the territorial jurisdiction of any court.” But the fact of
allowing such a reservation “goes far to destroy the validity of the present decision’s grounding.”
Id. at 208. Mustering other examples, Rutledge also discussed the local impact of Ahrens for the
District of Columbia, which confined some of its prisoners in Virginia. Id. at 207 & n.24.
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their behalf. Without knowing the district of confinement, a petitioner would be unable to
sustain the burden of establishing jurisdiction in any court in the land.”68 Rutledge speculated
that such events might arise from “military detention,” from “mass evacuation of groups . . . in
time of emergency,” or “possibly, though it is to be hoped not often, even from wilful
misconduct by arbitrary executive officials overreaching their constitutional or statutory
authority.”69 Those specific scenarios did not immediately materialize, but Rutledge’s discussion
of wartime detentions, which clearly marks the Ahrens dissent as a work of its time, also explain
the relevance of that opinion fifty years later.
Two cases decided between Ahrens and Rasul need quick mention. In Eisentrager v.
Johnson (one year after Rutledge died), the Courtrefused habeas relief to foreigners imprisoned
by the United States Army in Germany.70 A military tribunal had convicted the petitioners of
conducting hostile military activities after Germany’s surrender. The Court cited a history of
denying judicial access to “nonresident enemy aliens,” and concluded that “[n]othing in the text
of the Constitution . . . [or] anything in our statutes” provides habeas jurisdiction to persons
outside the United States.71 The district court, expressing fidelity to Ahrens’s view of territorial
jurisdiction, was affirmed. Because the detainees lay outside the federal district’s boundaries,
they could receive no relief. The court of appeals had sought to bypass Ahrens using
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Id. at 210.
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Id.
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339 U.S. 763 (1950). Justice Black dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy.

71

Id. at 768.
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constitutional norms and “fundamentals,” and that decision was reversed.72
By contrast, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court73 signaled growing dissatisfaction with
Ahrens. Braden was an Alabama prisoner who filed a habeas petition challenging a three-yearold Kentucky indictment as a violation of his speedy trial rights. Because Braden filed in
Kentucky’s district court, the question arose whether his case was “within” the district court’s
“respective jurisdiction[]” while he was being held in Alabama.74 Justice Brennan wrote for a
majority that jurisdiction in Kentucky was proper, because, as Rutledge had argued in Ahrens,
“[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.”75 The Court in Braden viewed
statutory and doctrinal developments as having had “a profound effect on [Ahrens’s] continuing
vitality,” and held that Ahrens could no longer stand as “an inflexible jurisdictional rule” but only
as a decision applying “traditional principles of venue.”76
Then came Guantanamo Bay and Rasul. After the September 11 attacks, Congress
authorized the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
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Id. at 768, 790.
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410 U.S. 484 (1973).
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28 U.S.C. 2241(a) (2000). Other issues in the case concerned timing and exhaustion
requirements applicable to speedy trial claims. Braden, 410 U.S. at 488-93.
75

Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95 (emphasis added); see Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 196-97
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Incidentally, Brennan was the lineal successor to Rutledge’s seat on
the Court.
76

Technically, it should be said that the holding in Ahrens cannot possibly be explained
using venue principles. That is because the government in Ahrens waived any defenses to
hearing the case in the District of Columbia, Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 193, thereby rendering any
waivable defense such as venue (unlike jurisdiction) wholly irrelevant.
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organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks . . . or harbored such organizations or persons.”77 As the President took military action in
Afghanistan, the United States began confining hundreds of non-American citizens at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, on Cuba’s southeastern coast. A 1903 lease between the United
States and Cuba stated that “the United States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate
sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over [Guantanamo Bay],” but that “the Republic of Cuba
consents that during the period of the occupation by the United States . . . the United States shall
exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas.”78 By later treaty, the
Guantanamo lease became indefinite, and it will last as long as the United States does not
abandon the base.79
In 2002, foreign detainees at Guantanamo filed habeas petitions in the District of
Columbia against Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. The petitioners claimed that they had not
performed any terrorist act, that they were not combatants against the United States, and that they
were unlawfully held without charges, counsel, or access to any court or tribunal. In response,
the government argued that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review Guantanamo detentions,
citing Eisentrager’s decision to deny jurisdiction and arguing that the Guantanamo detainees
were not “within [the district court’s] respective jurisdictions.”
The district court and court of appeals denied jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court
reversed. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion relied on the Ahrens dissent that law-clerk Stevens
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Authorization for Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, §§ 1-2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91 (2004).

79

Id. at 2691.
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had helped draft fifty years earlier.80 Like his mentor, Stevens declared the broad historic
importance of habeas “as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention” and stressed
its availability “in a wide variety of cases . . . , in wartime as well as in times of peace.”81
Rebutting the government’s reliance on Eisentrager, Stevens held that Braden’s
vindication of the Ahrens dissent made Eisentrager’s constitutional and quasi-constitutional
analysis unnecessary and, thus, unhelpful to the government.82 In Eisentrager, the detainees
resorted to constitutionally inspired arguments only because they were forced to accept, as a
statutory matter, the Ahrens majority’s “place-of-the-body” rule. Because Braden repudiated that
analysis, Stevens viewed Ahrens as now relevant “only to the question of the appropriate forum,
not to whether the claim can be heard at all.”83
The Rasul majority did more than simply embrace Braden’s attack on the Ahrens
80

Id. at 2694 & n.7 (citing and quoting the Rutledge dissent); id. at 2695 & n.9
(interpreting Braden as having overruled Ahrens); see also John Paul Stevens, What I Did This
Summer, 18 CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD 34, 35 (Oct. 2004) (“[H]istory played an
important role in our [Rasul] decision concerning the Guantanamo detainees. The precedent on
which the court of appeals based its decision, a case named Johnson v. Eisentrager, was decided
before Ahrens was overruled and had treated Ahrens as controlling precedent. . . . However,
because the Court had not had the opportunity to revisit Eisentrager . . . , many observers
wrongly assumed that the case would control the outcome of our Guantanamo decision. Thus the
Rutledge dissent written in 1948 significantly influenced an important case decided less than
three months ago.”).
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Id. at 2692.
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Id. at 2695 (“Because subsequent decisions of this Court [i.e., Braden] have filled the
statutory gap that had occasioned Eisentrager’s resort to ‘fundamentals,’ persons detained
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely on the
Constitution as the source of their right to federal habeas review.”). Justice Stevens also noted
that Rasul’s facts differed from Eisentrager’s because the Rasul petitioners were not citizens of
“enemy nations,” they denied any aggression against the United States, they were not tried in a
military tribunal, and they were imprisoned for over two years. Id.
83

Id.
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majority, however. As Justices Kennedy and Scalia protested, the majority opinions in Braden
and Ahrens said nothing about detainees outside the United States.84 But that ignores the
Rutledge dissent, which Kennedy and Scalia did not cite. Going well beyond the majority’s
analysis, and the case at hand, Rutledge crafted his opinion with a case like Rasul expressly in
mind, and that broader conceptual analysis --- absent from any other opinion in any other case --is what ultimately formed the core of the Rasul majority’s analysis. The risk thattechnical
barriers would block review of wartime detentions was what motivated Rutledge to press so
strongly for habeas jurisdiction over Ellis Island (in a case that otherwise lacked much emotional
allure). Rutledge would surely have been disappointed that the Court in Eisentrager extended
Ahrens’s approach and denied habeas jurisdiction to international detainees.85 But when the
Court returned to similar issues fifty-four years later, the principles underlying Rutledge’s
position enabled a ruling thatwas hard to anticipate and is difficult otherwise to explain.86 What
is most remarkable about Rasul is that the Court reached beyond Rutledge’s technical arguments
(which Braden had already accepted) and applied his normative view of habeas corpus in the
context of wartime executive detention that had concerned him most. The coincidence that
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion producing that result is stunning, but perhaps also appropriate.
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Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
cf. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192 n.4 (“We need not determine the question of what process, if any, a
person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any federal court may employ to
assert federal rights.”).
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Rutledge might also have been disappointed by Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942),
which allowed trials by military commission of anti-American saboteurs, and was decided just
before Rutledge joined the Court. But cf. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1946) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) (distinguishing Quirin without arguing that it should be overruled).
86

Of course, Justice Stevens, in his own right, has written strong opinions defending the
availability of habeas corpus. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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Before leaving this discussion, one might mention that, despite common substantive
principles shared by Stevens’s Rasul opinion and the Ahrens dissent, there are important
differences. Rutledge literally disassembled the Ahrens majority’s analysis, mustering
counterpoints for each point, attaching warrants to every conclusion, and filling footnotes with
scholarly research. By contrast, the Rasul Court’shabeas analysis contains only three elements:
a general celebration of the writ,87 a rebuttal concerning Eisentrager,88 and a second rebuttal
concerning presumptions against extraterritoriality. 89 With respect to the latter, Rasul held that
Guantanamo’s lease brought that territory “within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”
for habeas purposes.90
As that responsive structure suggests, Rasul’s affirmative argument for habeas relief is
spare;91 moreover, its two rebuttals stand in some apparent tension. As Justice Scalia puzzled:
[Part III of the Court’s opinion held] that the place of detention of an alien has no
bearing on the statutory availability of habeas relief, but “is strictly relevant only
to the question of the appropriate forum.” . . . Once that has been said, the status
of Guantanamo Bay is entirely irrelevant . . . . The habeas statute is (according to
the Court) being applied domestically, to “petitioners’ custodians,” and the
doctrine that statutes are presumed to have no extraterritorial effect simply has no
application. Nevertheless, the Court spends most of Part IV rejecting
respondents’ invocation of that doctrine on the peculiar ground that it has no
application to Guantanamo Bay.92
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Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
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Id. at 2693-95.
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Id. at 2696-98.
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Id. at 2696 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Perhaps the opinion’s clearest statement of its holding was the oddly textual declaration:
“No party questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians. Section 2241,
by its terms, requires nothing more.” Id. at 2698.
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Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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To rephrase Scalia’s point, if Rasul adopted the Ahrens dissent, why did the Court discuss, in its
extraterritoriality analysis, the peculiar status of Guantanamo Bay?93 On the other hand, if the
decision rested on peculiarities of Guantanamo Bay, why did the Court more generally hold that
custodial presence is sufficient for habeas relief?
One reason for such vagueness was Justice Stevens’s need to write for an uncertain
majority. Academics admire dissents and concurring opinions because they more often state
principles broadly, without the risks of losing votes or making bad law. Indeed, it may be a
professorial hazard to prefer quotable phrases and articulated ideals above other judgely virtues.
In a case like Rasul, however, Stevens may have decided not to explicitly overrule Eisentrager,
and may have added language (of uncertain significance) concerning Guantanamo Bay, to attract
Kennedy’s vote or keep O’Connor’s. As a former scholar, too often dissatisfied with busy
judges’ terse explanations for their rulings, Rutledge may have felt compelled to project his view
of habeas jurisdiction to unforeseen circumstances. But some members of the Rasul Court, while
willing to find jurisdiction in the case presented, were perhaps uneasy at restricting governmental
action before contours of our present “War On Terror” more clearly emerged.
B.

Hirabayashi, Korematsu and Hamdi

1.

World War II Detentions
If Rasul partly vindicated Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens, Hamdi condemned his vote in

Korematsu. Many details about the Japanese-American cases are well known, but some are not.
In February 1942, President Roosevelt, citing his power as Commander in Chief, ordered the
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Stevens also discussed, in this part of the Court’s opinion, the application of traditional
habeas jurisdiction to England’s “exempt jurisdictions” and “dominions.” Id. at 2696-97.
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Secretary of War and military commanders to establish “military areas . . . from which any or all
persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in,
or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary [or commanders] . . . may impose
in [their] discretion.”94 Implementing that order, Lieutenant General DeWitt, Military
Commander of the Western Defense Command, designated the Pacific Coast as various “military
areas” that were judged peculiarly vulnerable to attack, sabotage, and espionage.95 In March
1942, Congress criminalized any violation of military-area regulations and authorized penalties
up to a $5000 fine and a year in prison.96
A few weeks later, DeWitt ordered that all alien Germans and Italians, and all “persons of
Japanese ancestry” in specified parts of Arizona, California, Washington, and Oregon must be: in
their homes each night from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and at all other times at their residence, their
workplace, traveling between the two, or within five miles of their residence.97 Though the name
understates their breadth, these instructions would later be called “the curfew order.” DeWitt
also ordered that “to insure the orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese voluntarily
migrating” from the Pacific Coast, all persons of Japanese ancestry were prohibited from leaving
the area unless so instructed.98 This perplexing order blocked innocent persons, who might
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Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg.1407 (1942).
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Public Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (1942).
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Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173.
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Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (1942). Regulated persons were also
permitted to do business at a Post Office, Employment Service Office, or Wartime Civil Control
Administration Office.
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Public Proclamation No. 4, 7 Fed. Reg. 2601 (1942).
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migrate to avoid even seeming dangerous, from leaving areas that were important and militarily
vulnerable.
On May 3, 1942, DeWitt issued several orders prescribing that all persons of Japanese
ancestry should evacuate certain military zones. Every Japanese family had to have one family
member report to “Civil Control Stations,” and the only exemption was for persons in
governmental “Assembly Centers.”99 These mandates were called “exclusion orders.” DeWitt
later prescribed that Japanese-Americans be detained in Assembly Centers and Relocation
Centers, which have been called “internment camps,” “detention camps,” “prisons,” and
“concentration camps.”100 Whatever their name, the War Relocation Authority used such centers
to house over 100,000 Japanese-American persons for indefinite periods after their evacuation
from houses, jobs, and communities.101 Relocation and detention were deemed necessary to
allow governmental investigation of the detainees’ loyalty, which allegedly could not be pursued
if Japanese-Americans were allowed to live unsupervised in their homes.102
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In Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court unanimously upheld the race-based curfew’s
application to an American citizen.103 Kiyoshi Hirabayashi was convicted on two counts:
violating the curfew order by not being in his residence after 8:00 p.m., and violating the
exclusion order by not reporting to a Civil Control Station. For each count, he was sentenced to
three months, which ran concurrently.104 Hirabayashi challenged both the curfew order and the
exclusion order as unconstitutional delegations of power and as unconstitutional discrimination
against Japanese-Americans.105 Because lawful conviction of either count was sufficient to
support Hirabayashi’s three-month sentence, the Supreme Court opted to rule only on
Hirabayashi’s curfew conviction and did not address the exclusion offense.
Chief Justice Stone’s opinion for the Court denied Hirbayashi’s petition in three steps.
First, with high deference to military officials, the Court accepted that at least some persons of
Japanese ancestry, in “numbers and strength [that] could not be precisely and quickly
ascertained,” were a “menace to the national defense, which demanded that prompt and adequate
measures be taken.”106 Second, the Court accepted that innocent Japanese and Japanese-

evacuees in any other part of the country.”); id. at 201-02 (“[I]t is clear from . . . statements of the
military authorities, from the attempts to secure migration prior to the initiation of detention, and
from the fact that no program for the segregation of the loyal from the disloyal was commenced
until established by the War Relocation Authority approximately four months after the detentions
in Assembly Centers began, that such segregation was not the purpose of the Assembly Center
detention in the Korematsu case.” (footnotes omitted)).
103

320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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Id. at 85.
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Id. at 89.
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Id. at 99;see al so id. at 101 (“We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by
recent experience, that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading force
may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry.”). The Court also noted
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American persons “could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with” from dangerous
ones.107 Third, the Court denied that a military curfew must regulate “all citizens, or on none,”
because such a choice would improperly force the military either to “inflict[] obviously needless
hardship on the many, or sit[] passive and unresisting in the presence of the threat.”108
Although the Hirabayashi opinion stated (in the only language with continued force) that
“[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,”109 the Court
ultimately held that:
The adoption by the Government, in the crisis of war and . . . threatened invasion,
of measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition of facts and
“support” for the view that Japanese-Americans had failed “in large measure” to assimilate into
white populations. Id. at 96, 98 (“As a result of all these conditions affecting the life of the
Japanese, both aliens and citizens, in the Pacific Coast area, there has been relatively little
intercourse between them and the white population. The restrictions, both practical and
legal,affecting the privileges and opportunities afforded to persons of Japanese extraction
residing in the United States, have been sources of irritation and may well have tended to
increase their isolation, and in many instances their attachment to Japan and its institutions.”).
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Id. at 99;cf ., Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 43-10,308 (Mar. 28, 1943) (Denman, J.,
dissenting) (unpublished opinion), printed in Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289, 302-03
(1943) (Denman, J., concurring in the result) (“Because of [segregated housing and limited]
social intercourse, [white] people do not become familiar with the Mongolian physiognomy. The
uniform yellow skin, and on first impression, a uniformity of facial structure, make ‘all Chinks
and Japs look alike to me,’ a common colloquialism. Hence arises a difficulty for General
DeWitt’s soldiers or the federal civil officers in picking out from the other Japanese crowded
together in the segregated districts, and including men educated in Japan, the suspected saboteurs
or spies or fugitives from a commando landing or hiding parachutists. Also the difficulty of
identification of Japanese of known or suspected enemy aid, by descriptions telegraphed or
written to white enforcement officers.”).
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circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction may menace
that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution
and it is not to be condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances
racial distinctions are irrelevant.110
Three Justices concurred: Douglas, Rutledge, and Murphy (who initially drafted a dissent).111
Yet every Justice joined Stone’sopinion, and none disputed his analysis.
A year after Hirabayashi, the Court considered DeWitt’s orders concerning exclusion and
relocation. Toyosaburo “Fred” Korematsu was an American citizen convicted of being in San
Leandro, California, after DeWitt’s exclusion order took effect. Korematsu challenged his
conviction on equal protection grounds, and although the Supreme Court famously rejected that
argument six to three, what is less known is thatthe conference vote was closer. Chief Justice
Stone, joined by Black, Frankfurter, and Reed voted to affirm Korematsu’s conviction. Roberts,
Murphy, Jackson, and Douglas voted to reverse. Because votes are cast by seniority, and the rest
of the Court was evenly divided, the final decision fell to Wiley Rutledge. In what Ferren
imagines as a “moment of high drama on the nation’s highest court,” Rutledge told his
colleagues: “I had to swallow Hirabayashi. I didn’t like it. At the time I knew if I went along
with that [curfew] order I had to go along with detention for [a] reasonably necessary time.
Nothing but necessity would justify it.”112 Thus, Rutledge voted to affirm, Douglas later
switched to join the majority, and the only dissenters were the very liberal Murphy and two
moderate conservatives, Roberts and Jackson.
Most modern lawyers struggle to imagine a case more wrongly decided than Korematsu,
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but of course that view owes largely to hindsight. When Roosevelt and DeWitt issued their
orders in 1942, the United States had suffered an unthinkable surprise attack from an enemy less
familiar than the other Axis powers. Major sabotage and espionage seemed realistic, and
although actual invasion was less so, modern readers may not recall thata Japanese warplane had
shelled the Pacific Coast, and submarines had surfaced just offshore.113 To be clear, there was
certainly reason to doubt the military’s asserted necessity even at the time --- and the government
concealed information that would have raised far more doubts --- but few commentators (and
fewer judges) would have staked national survival on such suspicions until later in the war.
Some of what shapes our impressions today is knowing that U.S. military officials greatly
exaggerated domestic perils, and such exaggeration, more than anything else, is what clarifies
that Japanese-Americans were targeted mainly due to racial stereotypes and prejudice.114
Putting hindsight aside for a moment, it may be useful to reconstruct Rutledge’s
perspective to understand Korematsu’s mistake. Given Rutledge’s progressive views on race,115
113

See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 188-92 (2000) (collecting
contemporaneous evidence of the domestic threats and their popular perception).
114
115

See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 100, at ix-x; YAMAMOTO supra note 100, at 9.

FERREN, supra note 5, at 387 (quoting Louis Pollak’s prediction that Rutledge “would
have moved” against racial discrimination in public schools “if he’d had the chance.”). See also
Rutledge’s conduct in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), where Thurgood Marshall and
William H. Hastie from the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund argued that a Virginia statute
requiring racial discrimination in bus travel was invalid as a burden on interstate commerce. See
Pollak, Profile of a Justice, supra note 4, at 208-10. At oral argument, Rutledge asked Hastie
whether the main objection to the Jim Crow law should be equal protection, not commerce.
Hastie responded that he and Marshall were not making such an argument, but that they “would
return to the Court with a case making that argument in due course.” Id. at 210. A majority of
the Morgan Court accepted the NAACP’s commerce challenge. But Rutledge, unwilling to
paper over such deep questions of equality with commerce doctrine, wrote a one-line opinion:
“Mr. Justice Rutledge concurs in the result.” Id. at 209. “It is not unreasonable to speculate that
Rutledge’s laconic concurrence was a constitutional utterance of, ultimately, the first magnitude,”
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and his reputation as a champion of individual rights (alongside Douglas, who joined the
Korematsu opinion, and Black, who authored it), how could he vote against Fred Korematsu?
The two-part explanation is not easy, nor wholly satisfactory. First, as Ferren explains, Rutledge
trusted FDR in ways thatmodern readers may not fully grasp . Roosevelt had led the country
through a Great Depression, using “fireside chats” to support policies and to enhance his personal
charm. When Korematsu was decided in 1944, Rooseveltwas bien en route to winning his
country’s largest foreign war, and what is more, he had picked seven of the nine sitting Justices.
If Roosevelt said that something was militarily necessary — as his Solicitor General did in
Hirabayashi and Korematsu — that must have seemed to Rutledge, his colleagues, and much of
the country a strong reason to believe it. Indeed, the government highlighted its own credibility
by arguing in Korematsu thatcourts cannot accurately judge national security risks, especially as
to World War II, which allegedly presented risks “wholly unprecedented in the history of this
country,” including the unique peril of “fifth column” espionage committed by what would now
be called “terrorist sleeper cells.”116 Rutledge’s conversations with his first law clerk, Victor
Brudney, confirm the effectiveness of such deference arguments in Hirabayashi. When Brudney
suggested that the Court might benefit from an FBI report, which had expressed doubts about the
need for mass curfews and evacuations, Rutledge replied with possibly defensive astonishment:
What do you think you are doing? Don’t you understand that there are only nine of us
sitting here, and that the generals have said this [curfew] is necessary for the preservation
and security of the country? Pearl Harbor was attacked and more may happen. Who are
we to question this? What makes you think any of us will question this? Too much is at
namely, it indicated Rutledge’s view of the general constitutionality of the “separate but equal”
doctrine.
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Brief of the United States at 60, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (No.
43-870); see id. at 34, 16.
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stake, and we are too far removed from the realities.117
Part of that effect surely owed to Rutledge’s trust, not in military officials generally, but in
Roosevelt himself.
Second, as Ahrens’s dissent makes clear, Rutledge was committed to legal principle, and
he saw Korematsu as conceptually inseparable from Hirabayashi --- despite academics’
consistently opposite view.118 Modern jurists study Korematsu as an indefensible affirmance of
Japanese-American internment, and Hirabayashi as a curfew case of moderate insignificance.119
Justice Roberts’s Korematsu dissent encapsulates today’s orthodoxy:
[Korematsu] is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night as was
[Hirabayashi], . . . nor a case of temporary exclusion of a citizen from an area for
his own safety or that of the community . . . . On the contrary, it is the case of
convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a
concentration camp based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry,
without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards
the United States.120
Comparing the briefs in Korematsu and Hirabayashi, however, yields a different picture.
To start with the obvious, both concerned the validity of military orders from the same officer
(DeWitt), authorized by the same statute and presidential order, based on the same asserted
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emergency, incorporating the same racial presuppositions, supported by the same dubious social
science, asserting the same need for military deference, and invoking the same claim of judicial
incompetence.121 Of course, Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion was correct that a curfew, even
combined with near-house-arrest, is substantially less disruptivethan relocation and detention.
But closer factual analysis makes even that bright line less forceful. Hirabayashi was convicted
not only of breaking curfew; he was found in a restricted area and was also charged with failing
to report to a Civil Control Station under DeWitt’s exclusion order. The latter count’s validity
was litigated and was squarely before the Court, yet no Justice addressed the subject.122 By
comparison, Korematsu’s case did not — as many today believe — involve a challenge to
indefinite detention, nor did it seek relief from relocation. Korematsu himselfwas not
indefinitely detained, nor had he been relocated. Instead, he filed a direct appeal from his
criminal conviction, and that conviction concerned his failure to report to a Civil Control Station,
just like Hirabayashi.
From the perspective of the military and the Court, the convictions in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi were valid for the same reasons: (i) they involved persons of presumptively
“menac[ing]” Japanese descent (ii) who “could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with,”
121

Compare Brief of the United States at 3-32, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
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Station within the designated area, it appearing that appellant’s required presence there was a
preliminary step to the exclusion from that area of persons of Japanese ancestry.” Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1943).
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and (iii) the military could use racial filters that might seem “odious” during peacetime to avoid
imposing “obviously needless hardship” on the general populace. More specifically, the military
judged that curfew and relocation were both needed to counter possible invasion, sabotage, and
espionage. Although that conclusion was eventually proved wrong, and its supporting evidence
flawed, even today one struggles to see a judicially cognizable difference between the curfew and
the relocation.
Indeed, only one of Korematsu’s dissenters (Justice Roberts) even tried to distinguish the
unanimous Hirabayashi decision.123 The rest quietly renounced their year-old votes.124 As for
Roberts, he argued that Korematsu and Hirabayashi were different because the government’s
exclusion order was “part of an over-all plan for forceable detention.”125 The link between
exclusion and detention was also explicit in Hirabayashi, of course. But more importantly, the
Hirabayashi Court explicitly stated that the relevant federal statute, executive orders, and
military proclamations were “not to be read in isolation” but were “parts of a single program and
must be judged as such.”126 A shortfall in Roberts’s dissent is his failure to realize that, although
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Murphy’s dissent effectively repents his concurrence in Hirabayashi and does not even
cite the earlier decision. One might infer that his changed view resulted in part from more
information the post-Hirabayashi government report concerning DeWitt’s justification and
motives. Id. at 236 n.1 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (clarifying with notable detail that that report
was not made public until after Hirabayashi was decided).
Jackson’s dissent also does not deny that Korematsu’s result follows logically from
Hirabayashi. Id. at 246-47. Instead, he lists Hirabayashi’s principled expansion as an example
of the inherent risks of wartime jurisprudence. In Jackson’s words, “we should learn something
from [the Hirabayashi] experience,” and, his Korematsu vote indicates, we should not repeat it.
Id. at 246.
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Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 103 (“[T]he Executive Order, the Proclamations, and the
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the Hirabayashi curfew and travel limits were milder, they were just as much part of the
military’s overall, racially targeted security plan as were the evacuation and relocation orders. As
was clear to the Court and was dispositive for Rutledge, the practical effects of Korematsu and
Hirabayashi may have differed,127 but their legal principles were similar indeed.
None of this remotely suggests that Rutledge voted correctly in Korematsu, but it does
shift the error’s location to Hirabayashi, a case where (during Rutledge’s first year at the Court)
even the most “heroic” Korematsu dissenter, Justice Murphy, was ultimately pressured by
Frankfurter and Reed to accept the government’s position.128 As we have seen, the strongest
critique of Korematsu is that the exclusion order was unnecessary, and that should have been
evident from the government’s weak arguments at the time. The same should be said of
Hirabayashi’s curfew, however. There was most likely no adequate reason for imposing a mass
curfew and travel restrictions on any population along the Pacific Coast, but even if there were,
such regulations should have applied to all persons in sensitive areas. If one must imagine bands
of black-clad, midnight saboteurs seeking to bomb factories or shipping docks, it is hard to see
why their skin color or ancestry should matter much. Furthermore, as a matter of history, there
was no evidence of sabotage or espionage undertaken by persons of Japanese descent; such

statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They were parts of the same program and
must be judged as such.”).
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activities were undertaken by people of other ethnic groups.129
The curfew and exclusion orders’ irrationality not only gives lie to asserted military
necessity, it also reveals a second source of revulsion at Korematsu, namely, its racism. Here
too, the case seems more similar to Hirabayashi than different. Under an anti-discrimination
model of equal protection, Hirabayashi and Korematsu were equally wrongheaded because both
involved racial discrimination without a compelling, narrowly tailored interest.130 Under an antisubordination model, to exclude a racial group from their homes and communities is uniquely
offensive — more even than curfew or house arrest — because it enforces diminished social and
legal status to create a class of “domestic exiles.”131 Yet the decision to impose race-based
curfews and travel restrictions also creates a second class of citizens, of “outsiders” within
society’s gates, and that alone would unquestionably violate anti- subordination principles.
For present purposes, what may be most important from this discussion is the
anachronism of evaluating the Japanese-American cases under any form of modern equal
protection theory, none of which was even nascent during World War II.132 When Korematsu
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was decided, Brown was still a decade away, and the District of Columbia — likelarge swaths of
the country — was unflinchingly segregated, with explicit discrimination from the public schools
to the Capitol cafeteria.133 Nor were the Justices unaware of how the country’s racial context
applied to the Japanese-American cases. In Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the briefs cited Plessy
v. Ferguson as ordinary precedent, to be debated and distinguished as legitimate authority, not
the constitutional pariah it would later become.134
Such historical context helps explain why the strong anti-racist language in Murphy’s
dissent and the Court’s opinion did not ring with the clarity or principle they hold today. 135 The
Justices lived and worked in a Jim Crow District of Columbia, and the Court oversaw a Jim
Crow nation, with countless discriminatory acts against non-whites each day. Perhaps the most
candid question is how such a tribunal could write that “[d]istinctions among citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people,” and describe the
United States, with no mention of legalized racism, as having “institutions founded upon the
doctrine of equality.”136 A decision upholding military racial classification and evacuation seems
a poor occasion to proclaim (for the first time) that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
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rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”137 Such phrases at best voice aspirations
that would need a civil rights movement to become fledged possibilities. At worst, the claim that
racial restrictions require “the most rigid scrutiny” bordered insincerity.138 Thus, although legal
principle surely did not support Rutledge’s (or his eight colleagues’) vote in Hirabayashi139
Rutledge did not see (and the dissents did not state) a satisfying basis for changing ground in
Korematsu.140
2.

Uncharged “Enemy Combatants”
Although hindsight and doctrinal shifts have now discredited Korematsu and

Hirabayashi, neither has been overruled, and the Court had no other occasion to consider
executive detention of uncharged citizens until Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.141 In late 2001, the United
States took custody of Yaser Esam Hamdi, who had been captured and detained by the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan.142 The United States transferred Hamdi to Guantanamo Bay, but upon
learning that Hamdi was an American citizen by birth, Hamdi was transferred to Virginia and
finally to South Carolina.
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In June 2002, Hamdi’s father filed a federal habeas petition claiming that the government
should appoint counsel and stop questioning Hamdi, and that his detention without charges or a
hearing was illegal. According to Hamdi’s father, Hamdi had been doing relief work in
Afghanistan, where he had lived for under six months, and he neither trained nor fought against
the United States.143 In response, the government claimed that Hamdi’s detention was lawful
under the Authorization for Use of Military Force. They argued that Hamdi took up arms with
the Taliban and was an “enemy combatant,” i.e., someone who was “part of or supporting forces
hostile to the United States” and “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.”144
The government supported its assessment with the sworn declaration of a federal official with
second- and third-hand knowledge of Hamdi’s case.
The district court was not satisfied and ordered the government to produce many
documents in camera, including all interviews with Hamdi, the dates and locations of his
detention, and all interviews with Northern Alliance members about Hamdi. The Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that anyone in a zone of active combat can be held based on an administrative
finding of enemy combatant status. In essence, the Fourth Circuit allowed courts to review
governmental assertions of fact, but not independently to evaluate the underlying evidence.145
The Hamdi case reached the Court under Korematsu’s dark shadow. Fred Korematsu
himself filed a brief asking the Court to hear Hamdi’s case, and the World War II cases were
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Id. at 2636.
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Id.

145

Id. at 2638.
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cited in several of the merits briefs.146 There were, however, important and obvious differences.
For example, Hamdi did not involve programmatic racial discrimination or mass removal of
citizens. On the other hand, it did involve the authority to detain potentially innocent citizens
based on executive judgments of fact and military necessity. That latter principle struck some
observers as uniquely dangerous in a “War on Terror,” whose uncertain duration might result in
long, indefinite terms of unwarranted detention.147
The Supreme Court ruled eight to one that the Fourth Circuit was wrong, but it could not
generate a majority opinion explaining that result. O’Connor wrote for a plurality (Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Breyer) that Congress’s Authorization of Military Force allowed President Bush to
detain any “enemy combatant” on the battlefield who supported hostile forces and undertook
armed conflict against the United States.148 For detainees like Hamdi, who denied hostility
against the United States, O’Connor said that procedures for determining enemy combatant status
should be judged using Mathews v. Eldridge’s due process test, balancing detainees’ liberty
146

Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioners, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696); see, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union, et al., in Support of Petitioners at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004) (No. 03-6696); Brief of Amici Curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation, et al., in
Support of Respondents at 20-21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696); see
also, e.g., Brief for United States Senators John Cornyn and Larry E. Craig as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Donald H. Rumsfeld at 17 (citing Hirabayashi), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004) (No. 03-6696).
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Cf. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
2003 WISC. L. REV. 273, 279 (2003) (“There already long duration of the ‘war on terrorism’
suggests that we ought not think of it as a war in the sense that World War II was a war. It is,
perhaps, more like a condition than a war -- more like the war on cancer, the war on poverty, or,
most pertinently, the war on crime. To say that law is silent during a more-or-less permanent
condition is quite different from saying that law is silent during wartime.”).
148

Id. at 2642 (holding that persons determined to be Taliban fighters could be detained at
least during active United States combat in Afghanistan).
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interests against governmental security interests.149 Applying that approach, the plurality
required that detainees be allowed to dispute the government’s enemy combatant findings before
a neutral decisionmaker. In some cases, however, the plurality said thatthe government might
legitimately use hearsay evidence, withhold military documents, or use independent military
tribunals as decisionmakers.150 With such dicta as a backdrop, the plurality endorsed broad
district court discretion and issued generous instructions on remand:
We anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that we have
indicated is necessary in this setting, engaging in a factfinding process that is both
prudent and incremental. We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these
sensitive matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that
might arise in an individual case and to constitutional limitations safeguarding
essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.151
Hamdi’s plurality certainly tried to reject Korematsu’s legacy, and O’Connor grandly
recognized lessons of “history and common sense . . . that an unchecked system of detention
carries the potential . . . for oppression and abuse of others who do not present [a] threat,” and
“reaffirm[ed] . . . the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary
confinement by his own government without due process of law.”152 There is, however, reason
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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Id. at 2649 (“Any factfinding imposition created by requiring a knowledgeable affiant
to summarize [documents regarding battlefield detainees] to an independent tribunal is a minimal
one.”).
151
152

Id. at 2652.

Id; see id. at 2648-49 (“It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that
our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in these times that we
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad. . . . These
essential constitutional promises may not be eroded.”); id. at 2650 (“We have long since made
clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation’s citizens. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in
its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
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to doubt that the plurality’s multifactor test, left predominantly for federal district courts to
balance, will sufficiently discipline executive decisionmaking, especially given the government’s
power to forum shop by changing a detainee’s location.153
To be more specific, much of what made the World War II cases difficult was the urgency
of security threats when DeWitt’s orders issued. By contrast, Hamdi’s detention seemed distant
from vital security interests, especially as more months passed. Furthermore, the Court decided
Hamdi’s case in the summer of 2004, just after the press had reported terrible events concerning
the exercise of presidential detention authority in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere.154 Such factors
combined with the government’s strict litigating position — which would have displaced nearly
all judicial review — to undermine the governmental credibility that was critical to earning
Rutledge’s vote in Hirabayshi and Korematsu.155 Even so, a President who is more like FDR,

assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”); id. (“[I]t
would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make
his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government, simply
because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge.”); id. at 2651 (“Any process
in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed
correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls
constitutionally short.”)
153

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (applying strictly a place-of-the-body rule
under venue principles).
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For discussion among popular print media, see, for example, Seymour M. Hersh,
Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004; Mark Bowden, Lessons of Abu
Ghraib, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July/August, 2004; Josh White, Army General Advised Using
Dogs at Abu Ghraib, Officer Testifies, WASHINGTON POST, July 27, 2004, at A18. Television
images and internet sources of such news were also available during this period.
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Hamdi’s attorney understood and underscored this point; at oral argument, he began his
rebuttal with a sardonic summary of the government’s position as “trust us.” Oral Argument,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 1066082 (Apr. 28, 2004);
cf. Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 2004 CATO
S. CT. REV. 49 (2004).
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with greater popularity and more demonstrable threats to national survival than the current War
on Terror, might find O’Connor’s flexible constitutional analysis even easier to overcome than
the “most rigid scrutiny” that failed to protect Mr. Korematsu. In that sense, although Hamdi’s
plurality is praised in some circles for having resisted contemporary muscle-flexing, attention to
history suggests that the result may not prove effective if the country truly faces “another
Korematsu.”156
Four Justices refused to join O’Connor’s opinion even though they agreed that Hamdi’s
detention was unsupportable. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote that due process
bars detention of any citizen without criminal charges unlessCongress suspends habeas corpus.
That argument seems inconsistent with precedent, and its inflexibility could, as a political matter,
lead Congress to suspend the writ more often, thereby allowing even unconstitutional detention
to escape judicial remedy.157

156

One of course should not overstate the Court’s power to control executive decisions in
times of true crisis. Cynics might suggest that, for popular Presidents facing true, demonstrable
threats, it makes no difference what any court says. The popular touchstone for such a view is
Biddle’s statement that “[t]he Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President,”
FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 218 (1962), but might also reach back to Hamilton’s
Federalist 78, which describes the judiciary as “least dangerous” precisely because it lacks the
military and financial force to implement its decisions. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton).
Such views undervalue the modern Court’s political authority. When the Court ordered
Roosevelt to release Endo, he not only complied, but shut down the mass detention program.
See, e.g., YAMAMOTO, supra note 100, at 174-75. The most egregious interbranch conflict in the
detention context was Lincoln’s famous failure to comply with Chief Justice Taney’s order in
Merryman. See. REHNQUIST, supra note 131, at 32-43. But even in that one-person case,
Lincoln quickly sought a congressional remedy, and defied only a Chief Justice riding circuit
(i.e., speaking only for himself) whose reputation was bruised by Dred Scott. Indeed, among the
great fortuities of United States history is the strong record of federal compliance with
unfavorable Supreme Court decisions.
157

Cf. id. at 2682-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Any description of such political risks is
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Justice Souter wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, based on the NonDetention Act of 1971. That statute provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress,”158 and Souter described its
purpose by explicit reference to historical conditions surrounding World War II:
[T]he Emergency Detention Act of 1950 . . . authorized the Attorney General, in
times of emergency, to detain anyone reasonably thought likely to engage in
espionage or sabotage. That statute was repealed in 1971 out of fear that it could
authorize a repetition of the World War II internment of citizens of Japanese
ancestry; Congress meant to preclude another episode like the one described in
Korematsu v. United States.159
By repeatedly characterizing the Non-Detention Act as “intended to guard against a repetition of
the World War II internments,” Justice Souter linked the country’s widespread dissatisfaction
with Korematsu’s result with operative legal authority guarding against its recurrence, at least for
citizens.160 Souter went further, articulating his reasoning’s constitutional premise:

unavoidably speculative and contingent. Our tradition of infrequently suspending habeas corpus
might well survive Scalia’s constitutional proposal, resulting in less detention beyond judicial
procedure. See generally Dembitz, supra note 101, at 178 & n.11 (documenting the historical
examples of suspending the writ). The point is we simply cannot be sure.
158

18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
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Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., concurring in the result); see id. at 2654
(“[Congress] adopted § 4001(a) for the purpose of avoiding another Korematsu.”); id. at 2656 n.2
(noting “the congressional object of avoiding another Korematsu”). As for the other Hamdi
opinions, Scalia agreed with Souter’s statutory result, but, averse to legislative history, he
declined to recognize its historical pedigree and objectives. Id. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
By contrast, the plurality agreed with Souter’s general characterization of the statute, but not with
his application thereof. Id. at 2640 (plurality). Oddly, Thomas’s dissent did not even mention 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a). Id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Souter also rested his analysis on a presumption against executive detention allegedly
derived from Endo. Id. at 2654-55. The inevitable other side of Endo, however, is the fact that
Korematsu was decided on the very same day. Cf., Gutheridge, supra note 101, at 1965-70.
Thus, it is hard to find in Endo any general presumption against executive detention; such broad
principles would seem inconsistent with Korematsu, where executive power was not limited to
52

The defining character of American constitutional government is its constant
tension between security and liberty, serving both by partial helpings of each. . . .
For reasons of inescapable human nature, the [Executive] branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest
the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the
cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally
amplify the claim that security legitimately raises. . . . Hence the need for an
assessment by Congress before citizens are subject to lockup, and likewise the
need for a clearly expressed congressional resolution of the competing claims.161
In response, the government mainly argued thatthe Non -Detention Act was satisfied
because Hamdi’s detention did occur “pursuant to an Act of Congress,” namely, the
Authorization of Military Force.162 But Justice Souter compared the modern statute to that relied
upon in Korematsu. After all, the detention of Japanese-Americans was also supported by a
broad congressional authorization of force, that is, the declaration of war. By logic, if the AntiDetention Act was drafted in order to prevent another Korematsu, it must require a clearer, more
specific statutory basisfor detention than appeared in World War II. That historical test is the

implementing the least restraint “clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language [Congress]
used.” Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944). More likely, Endo differed from Korematsu
chiefly in that the government had explicitly found that Endo was loyal to the United States. Id.
at 294.
It is also important that Souter’s analysis (and the Non-Detention Act) only extended to
citizens. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STANF. L. REV. 953 (2002) (discussing myriad risks
of allowing protections of liberty to hinge on citizenship). Moreover, the sharp distinction
between citizens and non-citizens is what allowed Murphy to say in Hirabayashi: “Today is the
first time, so far as I am aware, that we have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal
liberty of citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or ancestry.” Slaves, as
the technically correct premise goes, were not citizens. See also Dembitz, supra note 101, at 176
(“[T]he Japanese ancestry program brought to our law the first Federal measure of racial
discrimination applicable to citizens . . . .”). The failure even to mention slavery among such
racial discrimination illustrates, in starkest form, how unsatisfying legal rules based on
citizenship can be.
161
162

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2655 (Souter, J., concurring in the result).

The government’s other argument was that the Non-Detention Act applied only to
detention by civil authorities, not to detention by military authorities. Id. at 2639 (plurality)
53

greatest strength of Souter’s opinion; it distinguishes his interpretation of the Non-Detention Act
from other, notoriously malleable “clear statement rules,” and it creates an objective, bright-line
standard by which to measure future assertions of authorized detention.163 The Authorization of
Military Force broadly allows the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force,” but, like
the World War II statute, it contains no specific indication of an authority to detain. In Souter’s
view, Congress’s language (drafted quickly after September 11) was focused on military power
and sought broadly “to authorize the use of armies and weapons, whether against other armies or
individual terrorists.”164 Absent any apparent legislative intent to “augment Executive power to
deal with dangerous citizens within the United States,” Souter found the Authorization of
Military Force insufficiently clear and specific to satisfy the Non-Detention Act.165
Souter acknowledged two possible exceptions to that clear statement rule. First, the
government argued (and the plurality agreed) that the Authorization of Military Force allowed
the President not only to engage troops, but also implicitly allowed him to pursue any
“fundamental and accepted . . . incident of war.”166 Souter indicated that wartime Presidents
could indeed “deal with enemy belligerents according to the treaties and customs of the laws of
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For criticism of Souter’s opinion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 47, 94-95, and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2103-06 & n.271 (2005). Neither of these
articles addresses the core of Souter’s argument, namely, that the Non-Detention Act was
designed to produce a different outcome in a case like Korematsu. If one accepts that premise,
Souter’s conclusion seems directly to follow.
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Id. at 2657 (Souter, J., concurring in the result).
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Id.
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Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (plurality).
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war.”167 But he believed the government had the burden of demonstrating compliance with the
laws of war, and he found that demonstration inadequate in Hamdi.168 Specifically, Souter cited
the Geneva Convention’s mandate that captives be treated as prisoners of war until their
individual status is determined by a “competent tribunal.”169 In 2002, the President proclaimed
that all detainees from al Qaeda and Taliban are not prisoners of war because those organizations
do not follow the law of war and lie outside the Geneva Convention’s protection. As Souter
noted, however, that categorical determination cannot resolve whether it was proper to deny
Hamdi prisoner-of-war status, at least until a competent tribunal hears his claim not to be a
member of al Quaeda or the Taliban. Souter did not resolve whether the government actually
violated the Geneva Convention or the laws of war more generally, but he tentatively wrote that
“the Government has not made out its claim that in detaining Hamdi in the manner described, it
is acting in accord with the laws of war authorized to be applied against citizens by the Force
Resolution.”170 Accordingly, he found the laws-of-war exception inapplicable as a matter of
federal common law.
Second, Justice Souter recognized that “in a moment of genuine emergency, when the
Government must act with no time for deliberation, the Executive may be able to detain a citizen
if there is reason to fear that he is an imminent threat to the safety of the Nation and its

167

Id. at 2657 (Souter, J., concurring in the result).
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Id. at 2659.
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Id. at 2567-68 (citing Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S. T. 3316, 3320, 3324 T. I. A. S. No.
3364).
170

Id. at 2659 (Souter, J., concurring in the result).
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people.”171 Although existing criminal law would usually suffice to neutralize such threats,
Souter in any event noted that Hamdi had been detained for over two years with no asserted or
demonstrated emergency in sight. Concluding that there was no emergency to support Hamdi’s
detention, Souter finished with a flourish: “Whether insisting on the careful scrutiny of
emergency claims or on a vigorous reading of [the Non-Detention Act], we are heirs to a
tradition given voice 800 years ago by Magna Carta, which, on the barons’ insistence, confined
executive power by ‘the law of the land.’”172
Especially for readers attuned to Rutledge’s role in Korematsu, what is most striking in
Souter’s concurrence is its blend of principle and craft. With explicit appreciation of the Court’s
World War II errors, Souter construed the Non-Detention Act as a safeguard for constitutional
values and liberties. Unlike the Constitution itself, which has a mixed history of protecting rights
in wartime, the statute was more easily construed as an uncontaminated (though limited)
embodiment of national ideals of individual protection during crises. The upshot of Souter’s
approach was to create a solidly persuasive justification for ending Hamdi’s two-year detention
without charges, and to emphasize historical and legislative features that might deflect possible
charges of constitutional lawmaking.173
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Id.
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Id.
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The constitutional question (addressed in Scalia’s opinion) of whether Congress and
the President may ever detain civilian citizens without initiating ordinary criminal proceedings or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus is a deep one, and the Solicitor General said that any ruling
against the government would be “constitutionally intolerable.” Brief for the Respondents at 46,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696). In light of such political and
institutional pressure on the Court, and given the risks of creating inflexible constitutional
barriers regarding war powers in a conflict whose details remain novel and somewhat obscure,
Souter’s disposition of Hamdi on statutory grounds has much to recommend itself.
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By contrast, O’Connor’s opinion, despite other virtues, only partly tackled Korematsu’s
greatest problem — the governmental manipulation of facts and risk assessments in wartime.
Souter’s opinion deliberately called such historical dangers to mind, even while taking strong
steps to prevent their repetition. By requiring a clear congressional statement before citizens are
detained without charges, and by explicit reminder of what may happen when such power is
granted, Souter provided the very sort of calm, normatively grounded analysis that Rutledge
might have admired, even in an opinion to correct his own greatest mistake.174175
C.

Yamashita and Hamdan

1.

A Japanese Commander
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To be clear, Souter’s opinion did not abandon the constitutional field altogether. He
suggested that notice, fair rebuttal, neutral decisionmaker, and counsel are required --presumably as a matter of constitutional law. But he could not agree with the plurality’s
endorsement of evidentiary presumptions against the defendant or with the use of military
tribunals. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in the result). Another benefit of
Souter’s approach is that, by leaving the constitutional issue aside, the political branches may on
occasion see fit to grant more presidential power than an Article III judge would have thought
apt.
A final, possibly coincidental link to Rutledge is Souter’s disposition in Hamdi. (One
must say “possibly” because, aside from Souter’s notable attention to the Court’s history, Souter
is Rutledge’s lineal descendant on the Court and may appreciate his importance more than most.)
Justice O’Connor’s plurality voted to remand Hamdi’s case for a Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
with respect to the accuracy of Hamdi’s “enemy combatant” status. Four other Justices —
Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, and Stevens — voted to release Hamdi from detention, and only Justice
Thomas voted to affirm the Fourth Circuit’s decision. With no majority of Justices supporting
any one disposition, a four-to-four vote would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment by
divided Court. The Court also could have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted, thereby also allowing the Fourth Circuit’s ruling to stand. To avoid that anomaly,
Souter and Ginsburg compromised, citing a Rutledge opinion that was the first to explain and
acknowledge the need for such accommodations. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134
(Rutledge, J., concurring in the result). Souter’s Hamdi opinion presented a clear and unyielding
articulation of its substantive commitments, yet out of respect for the Court, his colleagues, and
the individual interests at stake, Souter was able to reach a practical compromise — just as
Rutledge is famous for having done in his time.
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Our last pair of cases involves Justice Rutledge’s celebrated dissent in In re Yamashita,176
and a pending Supreme Court case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which addresses executive authority to
try detainees in military tribunals. Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita took command of
Japan’s 14th Area Army just two weeks before General MacArthur’s “return” to the Philippines
began. Outnumbered by advancing Americans four to one, Yamashita could not control his
subordinates. Some officers disobeyed orders to withdraw from Manila, and their troops
committed unspeakable atrocities against civilians until United States forces overran the city;
other Japanese officers led counter-guerilla missions thatkilled 25,000 civilians. 177
Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, and Yamashita did so one day later. On
September 25, the United States charged Yamashita with violating the law of war, and on
October 8, he was arraigned before a commission of three American military officials, none of
whom was a lawyer. Although the commission was formally created by Lieutenant General
Wilhelm D. Styer, President Roosevelt had earlier endorsed the trial of Japanese military officials
by military commissions, and General MacArthur (at the behest of Rooseveltand the Joint Chiefs
of Staff) issued rules and regulations to govern such trials, specifically including Yamashita’s.178
175

327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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John T. Ganoe, TheYamashita Case and the Constitution, 25 OR. L. REV. 143 (1946)
(calling the opinion “masterful” and “penetrating”); J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE
RUTLEDGE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 369, 374 (1968) (describing it as “undoubtedly a great
opinion,” and “a careful examination of detail” that articulates a vision of fairness that is
“commend[ed] as a precept”); Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction:
Martial Law in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 870 (1946) (explaining
that “[w]hether one agrees with him or not on his several points . . . one must respect the ideal of
justice” that Rutledge advocates).
177

FERREN, supra note 5, at 2.
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Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 10-11.
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The government’s bill of particulars listed sixty-four atrocities committed by Yamashita’s
subordinates, and alleged that he had “unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to
commit [the enumerated] brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United
States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines.”179 Yamashita pled not
guilty, and three days before trial, the prosecution issued new charges detailing fifty-nine more
atrocities committed by other officers. Yamashita’s attorneys sought, but were denied, a
continuance to address the new allegations. In a nineteen-day trial, the prosecution introduced as
evidence 286 witnesses’ testimony and 423 exhibits, a vast amount of which was hearsay.180 In
his defense, Yamashita testified that he had not known of any misconduct, and two officers who
had personally directed atrocities corroborated his account. On December 7, 1945 --- four years
to the day after the Pearl Harbor attack --- the military commission found Yamashita guilty “upon
secret ballot, two-thirds or more of the members concurring,” and sentenced him to death by
hanging. 181
Yamashita filed a petition for habeas corpus,182 objecting chiefly that (i) trial by military
commission was unlawful because the war with Japan had ceased, (ii) the charge against him was
not a violation of the law of war, (iii) the commission’s use of depositions and hearsay evidence
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FERREN, supra note 5, at 4-5.
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Only two witnesses purported to connect Yamashita directly to any atrocity, and those
statements were so discredited that the prosecution did not mention them in closing arguments.
Id. at 6.
181

Yamashita, 527 U.S. at 6.

182

Id. at 4-6.
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violated due process, the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and the Articles of War (the statutory
rules governing military justice).183 General MacArthur initially wished to execute Yamashita
without waiting for judicial approval, but the Secretary of War ordered him to wait. 184 In turn,
the Supreme Court initially wished not to hear the case at all, but relented and granted certiorari
under pressure from Rutledge.185
After six hours of oral argument, the Court denied Yamashita’s claims six to two, with
Jackson recused. Chief Justice Stone’s majority opinion began by recounting legal and historical
authority for military commission trials regarding offenses against the “law of war.”186 In such
cases, the Court explained, judicial review is only available within a limited habeas corpus
proceeding that leaves the reexamination of factual disputes to military officials. Nonetheless,
the Court held that “Congress by sanctioning trials . . . by military commission . . . [implicitly]
recognized the right of the accused to make a defense,” including a “right to contend that the
Constitution or laws of the United States withhold authority to proceed with the trial.”187
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See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 283 (2002). Yamashita also alleged
that the United States wrongfully failed to provide advance notice to Switzerland, the neutral
power representing Japan’s interests, in violation of the Geneva Convention. Yamashita, 527
U.S. at 6.
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FERREN, supra note 5, at 8.
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Id. (“To a former law clerk, Victor Brudney, Rutledge later wrote: ‘[T]here was a
three-day battle in conference over whether we would hear the thing at all. From then on the
pressure was on full force.”).
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Yamashita, 527 U.S. at 7-9; see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); U.S. CONST, art I,
sec. 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress power “to define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of
Nations”).
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Yamashita, 527 U.S. at 9.
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On the merits, the Court first upheld the President’s authority to conduct trials by
commission after hostilities ceased, “at least until peace has been officially recognized by treaty
or proclamation.”188 Next, the Court upheld Yamashita’s conviction under the law of war on a
theory of ineffective command thatmerely “permitt[ed]” subordinates to commit atrocities.189
The Court cited international conventions that arguably presupposed effective military
commanders,190 but the majority’s core argument was thatsuch command responsibility was
necessary to accomplish the law of war’s “purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners
of war from brutality.”191
Finally, the Court rejected all challenges to the military commission’s lax evidentiary
standards.192 Yamashita invoked the Articles of War, which barred the use of depositions in “any

188

Id. at 12. That conclusion rested on practicalities of capturing war criminals, a
scholarly consensus, and examples from United States history. E.g., id. (“No writer on
international law appears to have regarded the power of military tribunals . . . as terminating
before the formal state of war has ended.”); id. at 11 (“[O]nly after [hostilities’] cessation could
the greater numbers of [war criminals] and the principal ones be apprehended and subjected to
trial.”).
189

Id. at 13-18.

190

Id. at 15-16 (citing an Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, the Tenth
Hague Convention, and the Geneva Red Cross Convention); cf. id. at 16 (citing United States
military tribunals rulings and international arbitrations to similar effect).
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Id. at 15. But cf. id. at 16 (overstating grossly the view that international law “plainly
imposed” on Yamashita “an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and
appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”); id. at
16 (“We do not make the laws of war but we respect them so far as they do not conflict with the
commands of Congress or the Constitution.”).
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“The regulations prescribed by General MacArthur . . . directed that the commission
should admit such evidence ‘as in its opinion would be of assistance in proving or disproving the
charge, or such as in the commission’s opinion would have probative value in the mind of a
reasonable man.’” Id. at 18.
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military court or commission” considering a capital case, and which forbade hearsay and opinion
evidence “before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military
tribunals.”193 The Court held those provisions inapplicable to Yamashita, however, because one
of the Articles of War introductory provisions named only the United States Army and
accompanying personnel as “the persons . . . subject to these articles”; it did not name enemy
combatants.194 Thus, the Court held that, even though Congress had amended the Articles of
War to recognize the existence of military commissions, it “left the control over . . . procedure
where it had previously been, with the military command.”195
Yamashita also cited the Geneva Conventions of 1929, which required prisoners of war to
be tried “only by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of persons
belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power.”196 Yamashita’s trial had indisputably
violated the Articles of War’s evidence standards that would have governed court martials
concerning United States personnel.197 But the Court found the Geneva Conventions applicable
only to prisoner-of-war prosecutions for acts committed while in detention, not acts before
capture.198
Yamashita’s constitutional objection to the commission’s evidentiary standards was
193

Id. at 18 & nn 5-6 (quoting the relevant statutes).
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Id. at 19.
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Id. at 20.
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Id. at 20-21.
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See supra note 183 (citing Articles of War regulating the use of hearsay and
documentary evidence).
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Yamashita, 527 U.S. at 23.
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summarily dismissed as follows:
For reasons already stated we hold that the commission’s rulings on evidence and
on the mode of conducting these proceedings against petitioner are not reviewable
by the courts, but only by the reviewing military authorities. From this viewpoint
it is unnecessary to consider what, in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might
require, and as to that no intimation one way or the other is to be implied.199
In sum, the Court concluded, Yamashita’s trial “did not violate any military, statutory, or
constitutional command.”200
Two dissentsissued. Justice Murphy’s was a fierce attack on the “command
responsibility” theory under which Yamashita was convicted. Citing the Fifth Amendment, and
a “philosophy of human rights which makes the Constitution the great living document it is,”
Murphy refused to accept that Yamashita could be killed for his subordinates’ wrongdoing,
especially when he was not alleged to have known of such crimes, and when American forces
themselves had dismantled Japanese lines of command in order to undermine Yamashita’s ability
to direct his troops.201
Rutledge’s dissent (which Murphy joined) focused on the procedures in Yamashita’s trial,
which he viewed as raising profound issues of fairness and judicial role:
At bottom my concern is that we shall not forsake in any case, whether
Yamashita’s or another’s, the basic standards of trial which, among other
guarantees, the nation fought to keep; that our system of military justice shall not
alone amg all our forms of judging be above or beyond the fundamental law or the
control of Congress within its orbit of authority; and that this Court shall not fail
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Id. at 25.

200

Id. at 26.

201

Id. at 26 (Murphy, J., dissenting); cf., e.g., id. at 40-41 (implying that Yamashita’s trial
was affected “a prevailing degree of vengeance,” at a time when “emotions are understandably
high” and it is “difficult to adopt a dispassionate attitude”).
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in its part under the Constitution to see that these things do not happen. 202
After setting forth a litany of departures from standard conventions of criminal adjudication --prohibiting ex post facto substantive liability, inadequate notice, liability without knowledge,
inadequate time to prepare a defense, and evidence without confrontation --- Rutledge concluded
that “[w]hether taken singly . . . as departures from specific constitutional mandates or in totality
as in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s command . . . a trial so vitiated cannot stand
constitutional scrutiny.”203 Given such massive procedural problems, Rutledge simply stated that
“this was no trial in the traditions of the common law and the Constitution.”204
Of course, the government and the majority did not claim that Yamashita’s trial satisfied
due process and civilian law. Instead, the Court held thattrials by military commission were
effectively immune from civil law standards and civil courts’ oversight. Rutledge described such
deference as plausible in contexts of “military necessity” or “battlefield” authority, but found
such concepts irrelevant after hostilities’ end. The ancient maxim that laws are silent in the noise
of arms has lessforce when the arms themselves are quiet. 205
Rutledge then addressed the Court’s analysis of the Articles of War and the Geneva
Convention. As with the Ahrens dissent, Rutledge’s opinion was detailed, precise, and
202

Id. at 42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

203

Id. at 45.
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Id. at 56;cf. id. at 61 (declaring that th e time pressures and surprises imposed on
Yamashita’s defense counsel “deprived the proceeding of any semblance of trial as we know that
institution”).
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Id. at 47 (“There is a maxim about the law becoming silent in the noise of arms . . . .
[Inter armas silent leges.] But it does not follow that this would justify killing by trial after
capture or surrender, without compliance with laws or treaties made to apply in such cases,
whether trial is before or after hostilities end.”).
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exhaustive. For each of the majority’s arguments, he offered counterarguments that the Courtdid
not try to answer. The Yamashita opinions merit closer attention than this space permits, but
what is most important, as in Ahrens, is the normative commitment driving Rutledge’s technical
analysis. He viewed the Yamashita majority as imposing “no law restrictive upon [Yamashita’s
capital] proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations may be prescribed . . . by the
executive authority or the military.” 206 Thus, Rutledge concluded his forty-page dissent in
plainest terms: “I cannot accept . . . that anywhere in our system resides or lurks a power so
unrestrained to deal with any human being through any process of trial.” 207 Whether objections
be based in common-law fairness, constitutional due process, Articles of War, international law,
or all of the above, Rutledge’s dedication to legal rule and judicialrole could not conscience
“trial” procedures as shoddy as those that caused Yamashita’s death.
2.

Bin Laden’s Driver
Forty years after Yamashita, Rutledge’s broadest worries about the effects of that case

never emerged,208 and it may be that the errors affecting Yamashita’s trial had been largely
forgotten or dismissed as “not the Court’s finest hour.”209 Today’s “War on Terror,” however,
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Id. at 81.
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Id.
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For example, Rutledge seemed to fear that Yamashita’s departure from conventional
procedures wouldcause a pervasive decline in United States criminal procedure. See id. at 81
(“For once [the door against procedural abuse] is ajar, even for enemy belligerents, it can be
pushed back wider for others, perhaps ultimately for all.”). Similarly, although Rutledge’s postWar hopes of entering “a new era of law in the world” were never fully realized, it is hard to lay
much of the blame upon the Court’s largely ignored result in Yamashita.
209

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2669 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing thus the Court’s ruling in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which upheld a
military commission’s decision to execute German saboteurs, including one United States
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has brought military commissions again to thefore . On November 13, 2001, citing the
Authorization of Military Force, the Commander in Chief power, and statutory provisions that
incorporate the Articles of War, Bush ordered thatany al Qaeda member or other international
terrorist designated by him should be tried in a military commission for violating the law of
war.210
In November 2001, Afghani forces captured Salim Ahmed Hamdan; the United States
took custody and transferred him to Guantanamo. In July 2003, Bush announced “reason to
believe” that Hamdan was a member of al Qaeda, or had aided terrorism against the United
States, and he designated Hamdan for trial in a military commission.211 On October 3, 2004,
Hamdan was evaluated by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, which found he was an enemy
combatant. 212 Separately, Hamdan was charged before a military commission with a conspiracy
to commit murder, property damage, and terrorism.213 The government alleged that Hamdan was
Osama bin Laden’s driver and bodyguard, who delivered arms to al Qaeda members and trained
with high performance weapons, all the while knowing that bin Laden and al Qaeda organized
the September 11 terrorist attacks.214 Hamdan’s military commission contains three U.S.

citizen).
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Order Concerning the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001).
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005). From then until October
2004, Hamdan was held in solitary confinement.
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Id. at 36.
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Id. at 35-36.
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colonels, and its procedures are set by regulation.215
Hamdan filed for habeas corpus in federal district court, claiming inter alia that the
President lacked authority to use a military commission, and that the commission’s procedures
were unlawful. As the case advanced, Hamdan stressed three arguments: (i) that the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 required a competent tribunal to decide his prisoner-of-war status before
any trial by military commission, 216 (ii) that he was denied the right to attend all proceedings
against him, in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, the Constitution, and common law,217 and (iii) that his commission was unlawful because
it was not authorized by Congress.218
The district court, directly applying the Geneva Conventions of 1949, ordered that, unless
a “competent tribunal” were to find that Hamdan was not a prisoner of war, he must be tried
before an ordinary court martial, not a military commission.219 The D.C. Circuit reversed --- in a
panel that included John Roberts --- and held that Congress had authorized the use of military
215

Id. at 36.

216

The basic logic of this argument relies on Article 5 of the Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S. T. 3316, 3324 T. I.
A. S. No. 3364, which requires signatory states to presume prisoner-of-war status unless that
status is adequately rebutted. A prisoner of war, in turn, is entitled to trial by the same
procedures that are used to try the signatory nation’s own troops --- a requirement that
undeniably is not satisfied in Hamdan’s case.
217

All sides agreed that Hamdan had been excluded from the voir dire process of selecting
commissioners from his trial, and that Hamdan would also be excluded from at least two days of
testimony during presentation of the government’s case. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d
152, 171 (D.D.C. 2004).
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See Neal Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 11 YALE L.J. 1259-1280-93 (2003).
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Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
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tribunals.220 The panel went on to reject Hamdan’s international law claims for three reasons.
First, it held the Geneva Conventions unenforceable in federal courts. Second, it held that
Hamdan could not assert prisoner-of-war status and thatthe military tribunal was “competent” to
reject any such assertion. Third, it held the Geneva Conventions inapplicable to al Qaeda’s
activities.221 The D.C. Circuit also denied Hamdan’s claims under the Uniform Code of Criminal
Justice, and held those restrictions almost entirely inapplicable to military commissions. 222
3.

Rutledge Again?
Hamdan has now petitioned for certiorari, and regardless of whether the Courthear s his

case, or that of another defendant tried by military commission, the basic issuethat occupied
Rutledge’s dissent is inescapable, namely, whether there are any limits that constrain the
executive’s choice of procedures in military commissions.223 Many of the technical arguments
supporting the outcome in Yamashita have changed. For example, unlike the 1929 Geneva
Conventions thatYamashita invoked, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relevant to Hamdan were
explicitly drafted to regulate trialsfor misconduct committed before (not just during)
detention.224 Similarly, whereas Yamashita read the Articles of War to regulate only trials
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Hamdan, 413 F.3d at 38.
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Id. at 38-42.
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See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Aug. 8, 2005) (No. 05184); cf. Amicus Brief of Office of Military Commissions, Chief Defense Counsel in Support of
Certiorari (Sept. 7. 2005) (No. 05-184) (“The certiorari petition raises systemic issues that
challenge the military commission’s very existence. These issues will affect every military
commission case and will persist regardless of the outcome of petitioner’s particular case.”).
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FERREN, supra note 4, at 242.
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concerning United States military personnel, the Uniform Code of Military Justice now covers all
persons within the military’s jurisdiction.225 In response to such changes, the government now
offers different technical arguments opposing judicial review, claiming that federal courts lack
authority to implement any of the Geneva Convention’s safeguards, and that military
commissions (of any sort of person) are altogether exempt from normal military rules.226
For our purposes, what is most critical is not such questions’ answers, but the renewed
centrality of Rutledge’s sixty-year-old concern that “we shall not forsake in any case . . . the basic
standards of trial which . . . the nation fought to keep,” that“ our system of military justice shall
not alone . . . be above or beyond the fundamental law or the control of Congress,” and that the
Supreme Court “shall not failin its part under the Constitution to see that these things do not
happen.”227 In Hamdan’s case or another like it, today’s Court will decide whether military
commissions are bound by our traditions of criminal adjudication --- traditions that may be
located in the common law, the Geneva Conventions the United States has signed, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, and the Constitution as well. If the Court holds allof those legal
resources inapplicable, on whatever set of contestable bases, the result will be unmistakable.
Military commissions will (again?) represent an area of unchained executive power, where
Presidents may freely apply any blend of engineered results and ostensible fairness that suits their
political taste.
It would be unfair to say that President Bush has created or authorized the creation of
225

Id.

226

Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 25-29, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Sept. 7, 2005)
(No. 05-184).
227

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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military commissions as “kangaroo” or “drum-head” courts. Indeed, the procedures for modern
military commissions may compare well to Yamashita’s more blatantly skewed trial. For
example, Hamdan’s commissioners are all legally trained, and any conviction would, en route to
the President’s desk, be reviewed by a panel of exceptionally talented lawyers.228 Furthermore,
Hamdan has access to counsel, he received a copy of the charges, he will be presumed innocent,
the case against him must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, he may generally confront the
government’s witnesses if they are reasonably available, and his counsel will receive even
classified materials before they are used against him.229
In both Yamashita and Hamdan, however, “more is at issue than [individual defendants’]
fate.”230 For it is one thing to say that Presidents, under the Geneva Convention and otherwise,
have broad discretion to try enemy combatants, or even thatmissteps in Hamdan’s case are not
so egregious as to require judicialaction .231 One might or might not agree with such a ruling, but
it is something quite different to grant (as the D.C. Circuit did) the President an unrestrained
228

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 167 & n.13 (D.D.C. 2004).
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On the other hand, the regulations governing military commissions provide no right to
a speedy trial, they permit the admission of unsworn statements in lieu of testimony, and they
provide that the presumption of innocence and right to remain silent are not “enforceable” rights,
arguably allowing them to be stripped at any time. See Brief for Appellee at 2-3, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5393) (citing 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.6(d)(3), 9.1011 (2004)).
230
231

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

The latter argument may be the legal realist point underlying the D.C. Circuit’s
discussion of abstention, which would require Hamdan to raise objections to the military
commissions’ procedures before the military commission itself, with the possibility of judicial
review only thereafter. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying
such abstention and refusing to hear certain of Hamdan’s procedural challenges under the
Geneva Conventions). But see id. at 42-43 (rejecting, without any discussion of abstention
principles, Hamdan’s procedural challenges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
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discretion to set procedures for military commissions as a matter of preference. Using the World
War II experience as background, the relatively “mild” use of military commissions in Hamdan
might --- as Hirabayashi was --- be a “wedge case” that leads courts to accept relatively small
departures from ordinary legal norms, which then serve to justify extreme measures. For
example, if military commissions are (as the government argues) unconstrained by the
Constitution, common law, the Geneva Conventions, and almost all of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, it is hard to see how any procedural safeguards --- from notice to counsel to
confrontation to impartial decisionmakers --- would be more than a matter of grace.
By way of conclusion, let us assume that some members of today’s Court share
Rutledge’s concern about lawless military commissions. The most apparent response, applied by
Hamdan’s district court, would be to hold the Geneva Conventions in relevant part “selfexecuting,” that is, judicially enforceable.232 That issue has occupied a great deal of briefing and
academic debate in Hamdan.233 However, two less recognized, equally potent options emerge
from our earlier pairs of cases. First, the Court could expand the part of Stevens’s Rasul opinion
addressing extraterritoriality. The government’s chief argument against Hamdan’s constitutional
arguments is that “aliens outside the United States [do not] have due process rights under the
Federal Constitution.”234 But Rasul’s analysis of extraterritoriality (which Scalia thought
232

Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 163-65.
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See, e.g., Jinks & Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004); Carlos Vazques, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 695, nn. 36, 63.
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Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 19 n.11, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Sept. 7,
2005) (No. 05-184) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)
(rejecting “the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign
territory of the United States”)).
71

superfluous) found thatpresumptions against extraterritorial application of United States law
inapplicable to Guantanamo Bay, because the extraordinary level of United States control
brought it “within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”235 That same reasoning,
which in Rasul supported application of the habeas statute to Guantanamo Bay, could in Hamdan
extend constitutional rights to detainees in Guantanamo Bay. The question would of course
remain whether particular constitutional rights are categorically inapplicable to trials by military
commission at any location, but the Court’s answer under that approach would be in an important
sense uniform: Hamdan would be entitled to the same constitutional rights in Guantanamo Bay
as he would in Miami, and within United States territory, aliens are normally entitled to the same
constitutional rights as United States citizens.236 Naturally, the Courtmight make allowances for
particular military commission procedures, but such a ruling would at least ensure (as Rutledge
tried to in Yamashita) thatthe executive’s use of military commissions outside the field of battle
hostilities remains integrated with ordinary norms of procedural justice and subject to significant
oversight by Article III courts.237
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Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696 (2004) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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See, e.g., Cole, supra note 158, at 978-79 (“The Constitution does distinguish in some
respects between the rights of citizens and noncitizens. But in fact, relatively little turns on
citizenship status. The right to vote and the right to run for federal elective office are restricted to
citizens, but all of the other rights are written without such limitation. . . . Specifically, the Court
has stated that neither the First nor the Fifth Amendment ‘acknowledges any distinction between
citizens and resident aliens.’ For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal
Protection Clause is ‘universal in [its] application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to differences of . . . nationality.’ . . . And when noncitizens, no matte what their
status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal
process.” (footnotes omitted)).
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From the perspective of court-watching, it may be important that John Roberts, if he is
confirmed, would be recused from deciding the Hamdan case, because he was on the D.C.
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A second legal response rests in Souter’s Hamdi concurrence. There, Souter
acknowledged an implicit exception to the Non-Detention Act, which allows Presidents to “deal
with enemy belligerents according to the treaties and customs of the laws of war.”238 Souter thus
construed the laws of war as a determinant of executive power --- which is indisputably subject
to judicial review --- rather than a source of detainees’ individual rights, That characterization
allowed Souter to analyze executive compliance with the Geneva Convention without engaging
well-traveled debates over whether the Convention is “self-executing.” Federal courts may or
may not have authority to enforce individual rights under the Geneva Conventions. But the
judiciary has undisputed responsibility to enforce valid limits (from whatever source) on
executive power.239
In Hamdan, military commissions are roundly acknowledged to be primarily creatures of
common law, designed to deal with alleged violations of the law of war.240 In that light, the
contours of presidential power to use military commissions --- either generally, or when they
contravene otherwise applicable constitutional safeguards --- may be defined by the limits of

Circuit panel that decided the case. Under such circumstances, the dispositive fifth vote might be
Justice Kennedy’s. The same might be true if President Bush chooses a strong conservative to
succeed Justice O’Connor.
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2657 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in the result).
This principle could derive from a common-law limitation of the Non-Detention Act or of the
Authorization of Military Force.
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Cf. Yamashita, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1947) (“Congress by sanctioning trials . . . by military
commission . . . [implicitly] recognized the right of the accused to make a defense,” including a
“right to contend that the Constitution or laws of the United States withhold authority to proceed
with the trial.”).
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Compare such common-law status and function to Souter’s analysis of the laws-of-war
exception to the Non-Detention Act, see supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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United States treaty and other international law obligations. Such analysis would preserve
executive power to use trials by military commission, but would also maintain judicial
involvement at least to ensure that such trials adhered to “the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”241
To be clear, judicial reliance on either of these doctrinal approaches is not beyond doubt.
Yet each yields a defensible foothold supporting judicial involvement in cases like Hamdan’s,
and right now --- not a moment later --- is the time to collect and evaluate such arguments. Our
country has known several eras of significant security threats, and each has become famous or
infamous based on its legal response. The Civil War era witnessed suspension of habeas corpus
and military commissions; 242 the World War II era allowed mass racial detentions and martial
law.243 Likewise, the modern Court has written, and will again write, opinions concerning
executive detention that determine the life or death of scores of individuals, contribute to the
United States’ perception as supporting the rule of law and human freedom, and affect history’s
judgment of our own capacity to learn from the past in shaping the future. With O’Connor’s
departure from the bench, the dispositive vote in those cases may fall to her successor, or to
Kennedy, and the country must fervently hope thata majority of the Court will find a way to
honor the high juridical standards that such political pressure requires.
III.

Conclusion: You Are What You Read
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Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 3, 6 U.S.T.
3316 (1949). This requirement of “Common Article 3” is applicable to prisoners of war and
civilians alike.
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REHNQUIST, supra note 148, at 118-37.
See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 100, at vii;YAMAMOTO, supra note 100, at 194.
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A final, separate lesson from Ferren’s book and Rutledge’s story concerns judicial
biography as a genre. This Review has offered a two-part argument that Rutledge and his work
deserve greater attention. But some readers may wonder, “If Rutledge really is such a fine jurist,
and his work so central to issues surrounding executive detention, why don’t we hear of him
more often?” Before answering, let us briefly consider why the practice of judicial
namedropping is so prevalent in United States legal culture. Even as Chinese language students
measure achievement in part by memorizing certain numbers of Kanji, there is a sense in which
students of United States law are measured by their knowledge (or ignorance) of certain judicial
names and personalities.
Part of thattradition owes to the significance of judges and their decisions in United
States history. This country has an undeniable fetish for our Constitution --- with powerful moral
attachment to free speech, due process, and equal protection --- and American judges have
established themselves in the public eye as the singular oracles who give the instrument voice.244
Another factor is the absence of any educational “career track” for common-law judges; thus,
individuals’ skills and arts more naturally seem personal or even idiosyncratic. Given timeless
debates over whether wisdom is something that can be taught, 245 our system of training and
picking judges seems to suppose that judgment is largely a feature of who someone is, rather than
what they learned in any school.
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For descriptions and instantiations of this phenomenon, see, for example, BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 3-31 (1998); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS (1997); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 9-34, 207-48
(2004).
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PLATO, Meno, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 354 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns, ed.) (1961).
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For those and other reasons, discussion of judges and judicial role flows through two
overlapping channels. First, a propositional or discursive mode attempts to formulate principles
to define and delimit proper judicial behavior. Ronald Dworkin’s work is an abstract example of
such discussion;246 so is Alexander Bickel’s,247 Owen Fiss’s, 248 Cass Sunstein’s,249 and many
narrower efforts to define what judges ought to do in particular circumstances. The discursive
mode describes judicial role in explicit terms, but such precatory abstractions have drawn
vehement criticism, 250 and they have seldom had the cultural influence that one might expect.
A second, more popular mode of discussing is narrative or biographical. Many if not
most debates about judges orbit a charted constellation of “heroes” and “villains.” Names like
John Marshall, William Brennan, Felix Frankfurter, Louis Brandeis, Roger Taney, John Harlan (I
and II), Antonin Scalia, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and perhaps a dozen more stand out in the
popular imagination as different “types” of judges. Their lives, values, and decisions are thought
to stand for something, even though that “something” may not be precisely explained; and when
one name or another is invoked, listeners nod with some understanding of what is meant.
One of the more common tasks students perform in law school isto identify their most
and least favorite Justice --- current and all time. Through cycles of debate and education, such
246
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(2001).
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personalities are refined as positive and negative role models, and many lawyers retain such
images of “good” and “bad” judges long after their interest in Dworkin or Bickel has dimmed.
To state an important truism, such students fill the ranks of future lawyers, judges, and
professors, and that alone explains why judicial biographies --- the most comprehensive form of
the narrative mode --- remain an indispensable element of United States legal culture.
The problem, if it can be called that, is that academic biographers tend to focus on eyecatching judges with long (preferably evolving) service to the Court and a special capacity to
fascinate, whether it be a Holmesian epigram, Cardozan synthesis, Marshallian tour de force,
Douglasian tumult, or some role in sparking some revolution (or at least reformation) in the law.
We have always felt a need for judges with intellectual and personal verve, and we always will.
But the narrative mode too often overlooks thatjudging is not a flashy business. Law by nature
is a largely conservative enterprise, where “creative” arguments are suspect and the
“unprecedented” is heresy.
Throughout Rutledge’s life story, one sees a judge profoundly committed to legal craft
(perhaps too much in a case like Korematsu), and also steeped in compassion and awareness of
law’s human impact. In one commentator’s marvelous phrase, “Rutledge was rarely eloquent.
The judicial beachheads he took were won, not by sleight-of-words, but on the merits.”251 But
what may be most satisfying about celebrating such a judge is that his intellectual vigor stands
forever joined with an utter absence of pyrotechnic phosphorus.
When Ferren’s book ends, with a description of Rutledge’s death, the reader must
inevitably draw her own conclusions about how this judge’s life and career should be judged.
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Pollak, Profile of a Judge, supra note 4, at 191.
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Some observers have implied that, had Rutledge lived longer, his name might have earned
common mention beside Frankfurter’s or Black’s.252 Perhaps that is true. But it is also true that
Rutledge’s too-short career marked a judicial path very different from his colleagues. Wechsler
spelled out some of Rutledge’s distinctive characteristics in his pre-nomination memo: modesty,
principle, judgment, and “constant evidence of the quality — so treasured in Holmes — of
pointing [out] the implications of small things, if only by defining an underlying reason for a rule
or a concealed principle of its growth.”253
The feelings most likely to strike readers when they finish Ferren’s book are some
sadness that the story was not longer, and corresponding surprise that a largely uncelebrated man,
who served on the Supreme Court for only six years, could upon closer examination sustain such
a solid impression of being such a very good judge. It is that sense in which Ferren’s book marks
a significant contribution to legal literature. The work not only portrays a distinctive type of
judge; the underlying story itself invites us to rethink how judges are valued in legal culture, and
how judicial biography figures into that process.
Although it took fifty years for Rutledge’s biography to reach us, the ideas raised by his
story concerning judicial role and values are uniquely timely today, as the country chooses one
new Justice and braces to choose another. Although the confirmation process, like several
aspects of modern life, has become highly partisan, that need not preclude a worthy result.
Today’s selections for the Court will be examined by our next generation’s judicialbiographers ,
and if John Ferren has chosen a surpassingly good subject from the past, let us hope most of all
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that our politicians choose others of similar quality for the future.
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